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EXCISING THE NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL FROM FOIA COVERAGE1
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INTRODUCTION
Several weeks prior to the 1996 presidential election, the New
York Times published a one-column story about a set of docu-
ments that the government had recently declassified. The article
described the culmination of a lengthy effort on the part of histo-
rian Stanley I. Kutler to gain access to tapes and memoranda from
the darkest days of President Richard Nixon's administration.'
This collection contained many gems, including a memorandum
written by Nixon in which the President related a description by
his aide Donald Rumsfeld of the then-chair of the Republican
National Committee, Bob Dole. The aide pointedly observed that
Dole had lost "some of his effectiveness because he is a 'knee-
jerk' defender of the Administration."3 Based at least in part on
Rumsfeld's criticism of Dole's unnuanced defense of the
administration, Nixon concluded that Dole should be removed
from the chairmanship of the Republican Party and subsequently
dismissed him.4 The irony: Donald Rumsfeld served as Dole's na-
tional campaign coordinator for the 1996 election.'
These Nixon documents have been sequestered from public
view since the early 1970s.6 The National Archives only released
1. The author acknowledges the Honorable Michael Daly Hawkins, United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, for his suggestion of the title. The noted phrase
within it was spoken by Lt. Col. Oliver North in his testimony before Congress during
the Iran-Contra investigation, in response to a question regarding whether he had shred-
ded all documents related to the affair.
2. See Tim Weiner, Nixon Memo Criticizes Dole Defenses as 'Knee Jerk', N.Y.
TMEs, Oct. 18, 1996, at A24. The National Archives released more than 28,000 docu-
ments generated by the Nixon administration in October of 1996 and over 200 hours of
the President's audio tapes in November of that year. See iL
3. Id.
4. See L
5. See id.
6. See John Welsh, A Scholar's Tale of the Tapes; UW Professor Wins 4-year Battle
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them after a lengthy battle waged under the auspices of the Free-
dom of Information Act (FOIA).7 The dispute over whether the
documents and tapes would be released began in the late 1980s8
and culminated with Kutler's 1992 lawsuit,9 which was finally set-
tled last year.0 However, the released tapes only scratch the sur-
face of the Archives' Nixon holdings." Kutler remained "mysti-
fied" as to why only some of the "special files" were released
while others remained classified. 2 That ineluctable "mys-
tery"-why some information is released to the public while other
documents are redacted or retained in secret by the govern-
ment-fuels the debate over the purpose and implementation of
FOIA.
While Kutler's story reflects FOIA's impact on the Watergate
imbroglio, another 1996 FOIA development concerned the Iran-
to Hear Nixon's Desperate Talk, WIs. ST. J., Dec. 8, 1996, at lA. Nixon sought to block
release of the documents and tapes, see Corrections, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 19, 1996, at A2,
and he succeeded in doing so for twenty years after his resignation.
7. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994).
8. See Weiner, supra note 2, at A24.
9. See Neil A. Lewis, In Newly Released Tapes, Nixon is Heard Grasping for Reas-
surance, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 19, 1996, at A21.
10. See Weiner, supra note 2, at A24. Kutler believed that the true reason for the
delay was the unflagging battle waged by Nixon to keep the tapes from becoming public.
"'The bottom line in all this was as long as Richard Nixon breathed any air, we would
not see any tapes."' Welsh, supra note 6, at IA. When Nixon died in 1994, the door
opened for the Archives to comply with Kutler's request; it eventually agreed to do so.
See Corrections, supra note 6, at A2.
11. Weiner's article concludes with Kutler's observation that former White House
Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman's notes "provided a tantalizing preview for some 201 hours
of Nixon White House tapes." Weiner, supra note 2, at A24. These tapes were released
on November 18, 1996. See Lewis, supra note 9, at A21; see also ABC World News To-
night (ABC television broadcast, Nov. 18, 1996) (commentary by Barry Serafin) (chroni-
cling the history of Nixon's abuse of power and the fascination that surrounds his ac-
tions).
12. Weiner, supra note 2, at A24. A possible explanation for the non-release of
some materials is the distinction that the National Archives has tried to draw between
political and governmental documents. See Jack N. Carl, Letter to the Editor, Nixon
Papers, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1996, at B8 (lamenting this attempted distinction and ob-
serving that "[p]olitics and government are mutually inclusive"); see also Nixon Told
Kissinger of Secret Tapings, Archives Papers Show, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1996, at A13
(quoting scholarly opinion that many documents were not released by the Archives be-
cause they were deemed "political rather than governmental"). The Archives subsequently
announced that the tapes would be released in their entirety over a period of years, with
the next group due in 1998. See Welsh, supra note 6, at 1A. No further information is
available about the administrative papers which accompany the tapes and which were not
among the 28,000 documents first made available on October 17, 1996. See Carl, supra,
at B8.
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Contra scandal of the mid-1980s. In Armstrong v. Executive Office
of the President,3 the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit reached a holding of crucial significance regarding
the obligations of the National Security Council (NSC) under
FOLA. In an opinion by Judge Douglas Ginsburg, the Armstrong
VII court determined that the National Security Council is not
subject to the record-keeping or production requirements of
13. 90 F.3d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1996) [hereinafter Armstrong VIII. This decision repre-
sented the newest installment in nearly seven years of litigation between the Executive
Office of the President (EOP) and several groups of historians and reporters.
While this dispute has numerous iterations (both published and unpublished) in the
District Court and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, this Note address-
es issues contained in a relatively small number of them. Those cases are numerated and
referred to infra. The entire controversy can be mapped as follows: Armstrong v. Bush,
721 F. Supp. 343, 364 (D.D.C. 1989) [hereinafter Armstrong I] (denying motion to dis-
miss); Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282, 289-91 (D.C. Cir. 1991) [hereinafter Armstrong
H] (holding that the Presidential Records Act (PRA) impliedly precludes judicial review
of record-keeping decisions in connection with documents covered by the PRA);
Armstrong v. Bush, 139 F.R.D. 547, 551-52, 554 (D.D.C. 1991) (limiting discovery of cer-
tain computerized records); Armstrong v. Bush, 807 F. Supp. 816, 820-23 (D.D.C. 1992)
(issuing a temporary restraining order to prevent destruction of presidential materials
pending decision on FOIA complaint); Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President,
810 F. Supp. 335, 340, 342-43 (D.D.C. 1993) [hereinafter Armstrong III] (holding that re-
quested information was subject to the Federal Records Act (FRA) and that current re-
cord-keeping procedures were arbitrary and capricious); Armstrong v. Executive Office of
the President, 821 F. Supp. 761, 768 (D.D.C. 1993) [hereinafter Armstrong IV] (finding
the EOP and the NSC in contempt for failing to comply with earlier order); Armstrong
v. Executive Office of the President, 823 F. Supp. 4, 8-9 (D.D.C. 1993) (denying motion
for stay pending appeal); Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 829 F. Supp. 1,
2 (D.D.C. 1993) (staying motion for summary judgment on FOIA claims pending appeal);
Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 1 F.3d 1274, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1993) [here-
inafter Armstrong V] (reversing contempt order but remanding to the district court to
determine whether the NSC's guidelines were appropriate); Armstrong v. Executive Office
of the President, 830 F. Supp. 19, 21-22 (D.D.C. 1993) (requiring production, under
FOIA, of materials obtained by a former government official for part of his defense in a
criminal trial concerning the testimony that he gave during the Iran-Contra investigation);
Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 877 F. Supp. 690, 700-01, 704-06
(D.D.C. 1995) [hereinafter Armstrong VI] (holding that the NSC is an agency subject to
FOIA and must preserve its records in accordance with the FRA); Armstrong v. Exec-
utive Office of the President, 877 F. Supp. 750, 751-52 (D.D.C. 1995) (denying motion of
stay pending appeal of order declaring the NSC to be an agency); Armstrong v. Execu-
tive Office of the President, 897 F. Supp. 10, 17-18 (D.D.C. 1995) (granting summary
judgment to government for reprocessing of certain documents); Armstrong VII, 90 F.3d
at 567 (reversing the district court's granting of summary judgment for Armstrong declar-
ing that the NSC was an agency subject to FOIA and finding that the NSC is not an
agency for FOIA purposes); Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 97 F.3d 575,
578-81 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (allowing certain exemptions to FOIA requests), cert. denied, 117
S. CL 1842 (1997).
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FOIA.' 4 As a practical matter, this decision foreclosed any citizen
access to documents generated by the NSC within a reasonable
period of time after their creation; indeed, given the lax records-
preservation standard that the court imposed, many potentially
significant documents may never see the light of public exposure.
Armstrong VII concerned several statutes that involve the
dispersal of information held by the federal government, and it is
important to distinguish these here. First, FOIA grants broad
public access to documents produced by the government, with
certain statutory exemptions for various types of sensitive informa-
tion.15 FOIA requires federal agencies16 to comply with rigorous
standards of records production; 7 these agencies must make non-
exempt FOIA documents available to the public immediately after
their creation. 8 The President is not subject to FOIA, 9 and nei-
14. See Armstrong VII, 90 F.3d at 567. The court also held that the NSC was not
subject to the FRA. See id. For a fuller description of the FRA, see infra notes 21-24,
52-55 and accompanying text.
15. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1994). Documents need not be disclosed if exempted
because they are:
1) classified as relating to national defense or foreign policy;
2) related only to an internal personnel matter of an agency;
3) exempted specifically from disclosure by another act of Congress;
4) trade secrets, commercial, or financial information obtained from a privileged
or confidential source;
5) inter-agency or intra-agency memoranda not normally available to the public;
6) personnel or medical files;
7) certain information relating to law enforcement;
8) related to the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; and
9) geological and geophysical information concerning wells.
See id. In the parlance of administrative law, the exemptions are generally referred to by
number. See eg., infra note 198 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of what constitutes an agency under FOIA, see infra note 98
and accompanying text. Several previous decisions of the D.C. Circuit have discussed
requirements for being deemed an agency for FOIA purposes. See, eg., Pacific Legal
Found. v. Council on Envtl. Quality, 636 F.2d 1259, 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (designating
the Council on Environmental Quality as a FOIA "agency"); Sierra Club v. Andrus, 581
F.2d 895, 901-02 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (determining that the Office of Management and Bud-
get is a FOIA "agency"); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (holding
that the Office of Science and Technology qualifies as an "agency" subject to FOIA).
17. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1994).
18. See id. (discussing the procedures that an agency must follow when required to
make information publicly available).
19. See Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 156
(1980) (holding that the Office of the President is not included within FOIA's definition
of "agency"); cf. H.R. Rr. No. 93-876, at 8 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6267,
6274 (stating that, while the EOP is subject to FOIA, the President himself is not); see
also Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800-01 (1992) (finding that the President is
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ther are those arms of the Executive Branch that are indistinguish-
able from the President.20
While FOIA relates to the production of information, two
other acts concern the maintenance of records by the government.
The Federal Records Act (FRA)21 is intertwined with FOIA in
that documents covered by the FRA are subject to immediate
disclosure under FOIA.' In order to dispose of a Federal Re-
cord, an agency must initially secure the approval of the Archi-
vist2' who will not approve of disposal if the record has "suffi-
cient administrative, legal, research, or other value to warrant [its]
continued preservation."'24 The Presidential Records Act
(PRA), in contrast to the FRA, gives ultimate control to the
President, rather than the Archivist, over documents created dur-
ing the President's term of office.' Departments of the Executive
Branch which are indistinguishable from the President because of
the types of duties which they undertake are subject to the PRA,
and not the FRA. When the President leaves office, the Archi-
vist is required to release Presidential Records "as rapidly and
completely as possible;" however, the Archivist also has the option
to dispose of those Presidential Records which she determines
"have insufficient administrative, historical, informational, or evi-
dentiary value."'  Furthermore, the President is allowed to speci-
fy a length of time "not to exceed twelve years" for which access
not an agency under the Administrative Procedure Act).
20. See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
21. 44 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2118, 2301-2305, 2501-2506, 2701-2706, 2901-2909, 3101-3107
(1994).
22. See Armstrong VI, 877 F. Supp. 690, 698 (D.D.C. 1995); supra note 18 and ac-
companying text.
23. See Armstrong VI, 877 F. Supp. at 698 (citing 44 U.S.C. § 3303a (1994)). The
Archivist is the individual in charge of the National Archives.
24. 44 U.S.C. § 3303a (discussing the Archivist's ability to examine and facilitate
disposal of records lacking preservation value).
25. Id. §§ 2201-2207.
26. See Armstrong VI, 877 F. Supp. at 698. Before disposing of any presidential re-
cords, the President must "obtain the [non-binding] views" of the Archivist, 44 U.S.C. §
2203(c)(1) (1994), but, in the creation phase, the President decides which documents will
be termed presidential records. See id. He is guided only by the PRA's directive that a
President must "assure that the activities, deliberations, decisions, and policies that reflect
the performance of his ... duties are adequately documented and . . . maintained." Id.
Furthermore, the President's "recordkeeping practices and decisions" are not subject to
judicial review. Armstrong II, 924 F.2d 282, 291 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
27. See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
28. 44 U.S.C. § 2203.
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to Presidential Records concerning confidential advice between the
President and his advisors will be restricted.29
Against the backdrop of these information access laws, the
Armstrong VII decision is significant because it represents a fur-
ther tightening of the judiciary's interpretation of FOIA, resulting
in greater barriers for public access to government information. In
recent years, exemptions to FOIA have been construed quite
broadly in order to limit the amount and variety of information
released to the public." Unlike most litigation under FOIA, how-
ever, the Armstrong VII case did not arise through an agency's
claim that requested material falls within a statutory exemption
and thus need not be released. 1 Instead, it arose in response to
the Executive Branch's decision to sequester NSC records from
FOIA by rescinding the NSC's status as a FOIA agency. This
Note argues that the decision in Armstrong VII signals an even
more restrictive standard than the Supreme Court's recent con-
structions of FOIA exemptions: without even determining that
information should not be released because it falls within a statu-
tory exemption, the Executive Branch may now strip an agency of
FOIA duties simply by declaring that the agency is no longer an
agency subject to the statute.32 In all likelihood, this decision will
substantially shape FOIA law into the foreseeable future.
Part I of this Note reviews the factual background that devel-
oped over the course of a decade leading up to the decision in
Armstrong VII. Part II dissects the D.C. Circuit's opinion in
29. Id. § 2204. The twelve-year period also governs the release of presidential re-
cords containing personnel and medical files. See id.
30. See, eg., United States Dep't of Defense v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 510
U.S. 487, 502 (1994) (finding that the privacy interest of nonunion employees in not
revealing their home addresses to unions "substantially outweighs the negligible FOIA-
related public interest in disclosure"); Department of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for the
Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 780 (1989) (holding that disclosure of a prominent
businessperson's "rap sheet" was exempt under FOIA). But see WILLIAM F. FUNK, ET
AL., ADMINISTRATrVE PROCEDURE AND PRACrICE 590 (1997) (asserting that the exemp-
tions have traditionally been construed "relatively strictly"); Christopher P. Beall, The
Exaltation of Privacy Doctrines over Public Information Law, 45 DUKE L.J. 1249, 1257-58
(1996) (arguing that the recent restrictiveness imposed on FOIA information was not
within the original contemplation of Congress).
31. FOIA, by its terms, suggests broadly that citizens have access to the "records" of
any federal "agency." See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1994). However, the exemptions to this
standard often protect more documents than they expose. See id. § 552(b) (listing a mul-
titude of documents which are not available to the public).
32. See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
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Armstrong VII in an attempt to determine whether the NSC
should be an agency subject to FOIA. Finally, Part III turns to
the larger question that has pervaded FOIA litigation recently: to
what degree may the Executive Branch restrain public access to
information about the government?
I. SETTING THE SCENE: THE NSC AND THE IRAN-CONTRA
AFFAIR
The most important case in FOIA law in 1996, Armstrong v.
Executive Office of the President (Armstrong VII), 3 had its gene-
sis in the cloistered chambers of the National Security Council
over ten years ago. On November 25, 1986, the American public
reeled in shock as President Ronald Reagan revealed on national
television that up to $30 million received from covert sales of U.S.
arms by Israel to Iran had been diverted by American agents to
rebels fighting against the Sandinista government of Nicaragua.'
Members of the National Security Council, who were close advis-
ors to President Reagan, had circumvented explicit declarations of
Congress35 by structuring a series of clandestine transactions that
filtered the profits from the arms sales to the Nicaraguan guer-
rillas (Contras).36 These members of the NSC determined that,
although the tide of an intense partisan debate37 had turned
against the Reagan administration's position on the Contras, re-
sulting in Congress's moratorium on assistance, the Executive
Branch would still play a role in shaping the internal policy of
other nations.3"
33. 90 F.3d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
34. See David Hoffman, Iran Arms Profits Were Diverted to Contras; Poindexter Re-
signs, NSC Aide North is Fired, WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 1986, at Al.
35. In a series of statutes that became known collectively as the Boland Amend-
ments, named for Rep. Edward P. Boland, Congress, beginning in 1982, banned nilitary
aid to the Nicaraguan rebels. See, e.g., Continuing Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year
1985, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 8066(a), 98 Stat. 1837, 1935 (1984).
36. See Hoffman, supra note 34, at Al; see also infra note 38 (chronicling the de-
bates over the issue of funding for the Contras).
37. See Joseph C. Harsch, The Third Term, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR, Mar. 24, 1987,
at 15 (describing dichotomy between "what Mr. Reagan wants most, funds for weapons
and contras, and what the Congress wants most-progress toward a balanced budget").
38. See, e.g., John Kohan, Aiming to Gain Ground Talk of Peace, As the Fighting
Goes On and On, TIME, Oct. 10, 1983, at 28 (suggesting that a Contra offensive against
the Sandinista regime was designed to persuade Congress to renew CIA funding for the
rebels); Ed Magnuson, A Mystery Involving "Mercs". Deaths in Nicaragua Raise Questions
1481199]
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Devising a plan that was by turns dazzling in its simplicity
and horrifying in its ramifications, NSC staff member Lieutenant
Colonel Oliver North served as the go-between, ferrying weapons
to Iran and steering their proceeds to the Contras.39 In the dra-
ma that ensued for nearly a year following this initial revelation,
Colonel North, National Security Advisor Vice-Admiral John
Poindexter, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, and other
aides of President Reagan were summoned before Congress, their
schedules and motivations examined, and their links to the Presi-
dent scrutinized intently.'
In his initial announcement, President Reagan repeatedly
denied any knowledge of the scheme, stating early on that "I was
not fully informed" about "one of the activities undertaken" after
the- secret weapons shipment to Iran.41 The day after the Iran-
Contra link was revealed, Reagan promised the American people
that "future foreign and national security policy initiatives will
About U.S. Involvement, TIME, Sept. 17, 1984, at 33 (observing that American civilians
continued to provide aid to the Contras even after Congress ended official funding);
Anne Manuel, Nicaragua: U.S. Congress Strikes Heavy Blow at "Secret War," INTER
PRESS SERVICE, Oct. 10, 1984 (recounting expressions of optimism by the Reagan admin-
istration and Republican Congressional leaders that Congress would once again fund the
Contras in February 1985); Joanne Omang & Don Oberdorfer, Ultimate Goal of US.
Latin Policy Still Unresolved. "Military Shield" Changing Face of Region, WASH. POST,
Apr. 29, 1984, at Al (referencing the CIA legal department's ruling that Congress had
the last word on Contra funding); Michael S. Serrill, Shot Out of the Sky: A Captured
U.S. Soldier of Fortune Spins a Tale of CIA Intrigue, TIME, Oct. 20, 1986, at 44 (reveal-
ing that the Reagan administration maintained relationships with private organizations
that covertly supplied the Contras after Congress had cut off official aid); Bob Wood-
ward, CLA Sought 3rd-Country Contra Aid, WASH. POST, May 19, 1984, at Al (reporting
that the Contras continued to be funded even after Congress had refused to approve
another grant to the rebels in April 1984).
39. See Chronology: lran/Contra Crisis, in AMERICA AND THE WORLD 653 (Sara
Robertson ed., 1986) (Council on Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs Publication).
40. During the summer of 1987, Congress held joint hearings on the Iran-Contra
affair at which a variety of individuals, including several high-ranking Executive Branch
officials, testified on the matter. See generally Iran-Contra Investigation: Joint Hearings
Before the Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicara-
guan Opposition and the House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions
with Iran, 100th Cong. (1987).
41. Hoffman, supra note 34, at Al. Attorney General Edwin Meese also insisted that
the President "knew nothing" about the illicit payments to the Contras, stating that
North was the only person who "knew precisely" of the transactions and that Poindexter
"did know that something of this nature was occurring, but he did not look into it fur-
ther." Id. Later in the same day, Meese widened his net to include as co-conspirators
"others who may have been working in some capacity" with North, but he never sug-
gested that Reagan was one of those individuals. Id.
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proceed only in accordance with my authorization.,4' This
statement implies that, at least for a time, NSC policy was shaped
not by Reagan, but by officials within the agency who never re-
ported their deeds to him.
In perhaps the most frequently satirized part of the entire
affair Fawn Hall, secretary to Colonel North, revealed that North
had instructed her to shred thousands of documents which might
have further incriminated him and to smuggle countless others
from the Old Executive Office Building inside her clothing.'a In
addition to incriminating North, most commentators believe these
documents might have shown connections between the President
and the deals, although the destruction of the documents rendered
these beliefs largely speculative." Among the information report-
edly destroyed were logs of telephone calls to North, coded mes-
sages from North's network of operatives, and electronic interof-
fice memoranda. 45 The individuals investigated for their parts in
the Iran-Contra affair always claimed that they acted alone, with-
out the knowledge or consent of the President; these elusive docu-
ments might have shown otherwise.'
While the seeds of this scandal never blossomed into a catas-
trophe on the scale of Watergate, they certainly shook the federal
government at its highest levels.47 For many Americans, the im-
42. Id. (emphasis added). Despite the President's and Vice President's protestations
that they were never informed about the Contra aid, former Secretary of State Henry A.
Kissinger said at the time that "I cannot imagine a lieutenant colonel or even an admiral
like Poindexter doing this without somebody knowing." Id.
43. See Walter Pincus & Dan Morgan, Hall Tells of Altering Data, Shredding Papers
for North, WASH. POST, June 9, 1987, Al.
44. See iL
45. See id.
46. Hall, in her riveting testimony before Congress, did describe a North memoran-
dum, believed to have been written in April 1986, which described how funds from the
arm sales could be used to benefit the Contras. See id. This memorandum was forwarded
to John M. Poindexter, who revised it and recommended that it be sent to the President.
See id. Hall could not verify if the memorandum had been delivered to Reagan, but
observed that "it was typed for a reason and that it went somewhere." Id.
47. Although the affair caused the towers of government to wobble, none ever fell.
Former National Security Adviser Robert C. McFarlane, implicated in the cover-up, later
attempted suicide, see David Hoffman, McFarlane Struggled to Cope with Career Dip,
Friends Say; Police End Probe of Suicide Attempt, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 1987, at Al,
but none of the Iran-Contra actors was ever punished as a result of the hearings in the
spring and summer of 1987. See, eg., United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 371
(D.C. Cir. 1991) (reversing, in an opinion by Judge Ginsburg, Poindexter's conviction on
the grounds that his compelled testimony before Congress was used against him at his
148319971
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age of the compliant Hall forcing answers to important questions
into a paper shredder lingered on long after the hearings had
ended but eventually receded into memory. For one group of
historians, however, the search for answers continued. That quest
took a disappointing turn during the summer of 1996.
A. The Dispute over the NSC's Iran-Contra Documents
On January 19, 1989, the last day of the Reagan presidency, a
reporter, Scott Armstrong, and the National Security Archive48
submitted several FOIA requests for copies of all the information
stored on the Executive Office of the President (EOP) and NSC
electronic communications systems from their installation in the
mid-1980s until that time.49 Tapes from these systems contained
not only copies of some of the records which North and Hall later
destroyed,' but also encoded computer messages which might
have included additional information about the arms diversion
scheme.5' At the same time, the National Security Archive filed
suit in the United States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia seeking a declaratory judgment against the EOP, the Office of
Administration, the National Security Council, the White House
Communications Agency, and the Archivist of the United States
that the documents contained on the electronic communications
trial in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 6002 and the Fifth Amendment); United States v. North,
910 F.2d 843, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (reversing, per curiam, North's conviction on the
grounds, inter alia, that the District Court failed to hold a full hearing to ensure that the
independent counsel did not use North's immunized testimony against him at his trial).
48. The National Security Archive is a private non-profit organization which pursues
disclosure of information relating to defense and national security policy. See Eileen V.
Quigley, Washington's Movers and Shakers: at the Bar, NAT'L J., Mar. 1, 1986, at 523
(noting that the National Security Archive is designed as "a source of declassified and
unclassified documents for use by academics and journalists").
49. See Armstrong I, 721 F. Supp. 343, 347 (D.D.C. 1989). Since their installation,
the electronic communications systems have allowed the sharing of electronic appointment
calendars, the electronic transfer of word processing documents, and the exchange of
electronic mail (e-mail). See Armstrong V, 1 F.3d 1274, 1279 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The 1300
federal employees in the EOP who use e-mail often relay "lengthy substantive-even
classified---'notes' that, in content, are often indistinguishable from letters or memoranda."
Id. Perhaps most important is the fact that e-mail creates a "log" of entries of letters
sent and received, see iL, and that the government periodically creates backup tapes
which preserve everything on the system at a given moment in time. See id. at 1280.
50. See Dubious Distinctions, COMPUTERWORLD, INC, Dec. 28, 1987, at 14. The
tapes are components of the central computer archive, IBM's Professional Office System.
See id.
51. See Armstrong V, 1 F.3d at 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
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systems and their backups were Federal Records subject to the
Federal Records Act 2 and an injunction prohibiting their destruc-
tion. 3
The significance in labelling these documents Federal or Presi-
dential Records is profound, because Federal Records are subject
to FOIA, while Presidential Records are not. 4 Although certain
safeguards exist to prevent wanton destruction of Presidential
Records, the fact remains that Presidential Records can be de-
stroyed. In addition, before the conclusion of his term of office,
the President specifies a duration, "not to exceed 12 years, for
which access shall be restricted with respect to [national defense]
information, in a Presidential Record. 516 This open-ended policy
allows the restriction of virtually all information that might be
found in Presidential Records, most significantly records involving
52. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text. The Federal Records Act is de-
signed to insure "[a]ccurate and complete documentation of the policies and transactions
of the Federal Government," 44 U.S.C. § 2902(1) (1994), "[c]ontrol of the quantity and
quality of records produced by the Federal Government," id. § 2902(2), and "judicious
preservation and disposal of records." Id. § 2902(5); see also Armstrong II, 924 F.2d 282,
292 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (observing that the FRA is designed to insure that agencies' records
management programs "strike a balance 'between developing efficient and effective re-
cords management, and the substantive need for Federal records."') (quoting S. REP. No.
94-1326, at 2 (1976)).
53. See Armstrong V, 1 F.3d at 1280. "If a document qualifies as a federal record,
the FRA prohibits an agency from discarding it by fiat." Id. at 1278; see also American
Friends Serv. Comm. v. Webster, 720 F.2d 29, 62 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("Congress did not
intend to grant the [agency] . . . a blank check for records disposal.").
54. See supra text accompanying notes 21-29.
55. See Armstrong V, 1 F.3d at 1290-91. Just as FOIA requires strict adherence to a
record-production convention, the FRA sets out demanding guidelines in the realm of
records preservation; in that sense, the FRA ultimately protects more documents than the
PRA. See id.; accord Armstrong VII, 90 F.3d 553, 556 (D.C. Cir 1996). Also, the record-
keeping requirements of the FRA are subject to judicial review, while those of the PRA
are not. See Armstrong V, 1 F.3d at 1290-91. Furthermore, the PRA is applicable to a
President's papers only after he has left office, while the FRA can affect the President
while he is in office. See id. Finally, documents subject to the FRA may not be removed
by the President upon leaving office without the approval of the Archivist. See id.; see
also 44 U.S.C. § 3106 (1994) (providing that the Attorney General may initiate legal
action to retrieve records unlawfully removed by the President). The PRA, which both
parties agree applies to most NSC documents, makes those documents publicly available
"as rapidly and completely as possible" after the President leaves office. 44 U.S.C. §
2203(f)(1) (emphasis added). But see 44 U.S.C. § 2204 (restricting access to presidential
records after the conclusion of the President's term for certain categories of information).
Significantly, the PRA "does not include any documentary materials that are .., official
records of an agency." 44 U.S.C. § 2201(2)(B); see also supra notes 25-29 and accompa-
nying text.
56. 44 U.S.C. § 2204(a).
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confidential communications between the President and his advi-
sors.
57
After extensive litigation whether the records qualified as
protected documents under the statutory standards of the FRA,
the District Court affirmatively settled the question on January 6,
1993, nearly four years after the initial requests and suit had been
filed.58 The court held that, because the FRA's definition of "re-
cords" includes material "regardless of physical form or character-
istics," 59 the communications at issue (the saved e-mail) did con-
stitute Federal Records. 60 Armstrong and the National Security
Archive then sought full production of the e-mail, including the
encrypted computer messages contained on it, but the government
agencies balked; they argued that they had "reasonably discharged
[their] FRA obligations" by maintaining paper versions ("hard
copies") of the electronic communications.6' The court disagreed,
and it ordered the NSC and EOP to make its electronic records
management guidelines comport with the ERA62 and to review
periodically its employees' electronic record-keeping practices.63
The EOP did not comply with the court's order. Four months
later, on May 21, 1993, the plaintiffs petitioned the District Court
to require the EOP to show cause why it should not be held in
contempt of the court's order to produce the documents and to
57. See Armstrong VI, 877 F. Supp. 690, 707 (D.D.C. 1995).
58. See Armstrong 111, 810 F. Supp. 335, 335 (D.D.C. 1993).
59. 44 U.S.C. § 3101.
60. See Armstrong III, 810 F. Supp. at 340-41. The court's holding did not include
"non-record or presidential record materials" that were not the subject of the plaintiff's
suit. Id at 340.
61. Armstrong V, 1 F.3d 1274, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
62. See Armstrong 11I, 810 F. Supp. at 342.
63. See iL at 343. The District Court found that the EOP practices for electronic re-
cords management were deficient in two respects. First, the court observed that even if
the EOP employees printed out all on-screen information that qualified as a federal re-
cord, a process which the government claimed was already in place, the record would be
incomplete absent the attachment of the transmittal information stored in the computer
network but not appearing on the screen, such as the names of all individuals receiving
the information. See id at 341 (concluding that "[a] paper copy of the electronic material
does not contain all of the information included in the electronic version"). An example
of this information is the copies of the electronic data preserved after North's and Hall's
destruction of the hard copies. See Dubious Distinctions, supra note 50, at 14. Second,
the court found that the records management practices utilized by the EOP's agencies
failed to provide for any supervision of agency employees' electronic record-keeping prac-
tices, a failure which the District Court found to be arbitrary and capricious. See
Armstrong II, 810 F. Supp. at 343.
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create safer record-keeping practices.' The plaintiffs referred to
the EOP's having issued interim guidance instructions which failed
to preserve all records in accordance with the court's January 6
order.' The court found the EOP in contempt and also held that
the conditions surrounding the transfer of certain Iran-Contra
period backup tapes from the White House to the National Ar-
chives on January 19, 1993 (President Bush's last day in office),
violated the court's orders requiring preservation of the tapes.6
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit held that, because the District
Court's original orders did not specify that the government had an
affirmative duty to create new guidelines by a particular date, the
lower court should not have held the government in contempt for
its failure to promulgate new guidelines within four months, given
the government's "speeded-up attempts in recent months to assure
preservation of the tapes."'67 Nonetheless the court affirmed that
the NSC and EOP guidelines violated the FRA, and remanded
the case to the district court to determine whether any requested
documents classified as Presidential Records should be released
under FOIA.6
B. The FOIA Component of the Litigation
Only after the court had determined how to classify the docu-
ments did the litigation turn to the FOIA requests. The D.C.
Circuit's opinion in Armstrong V opened the door for the NSC to
turn over the requested information.69 Shortly thereafter, the
Clinton administration's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) responded
by issuing a memorandum, written by Walter Dellinger (Dellinger
Memorandum), stating that the NSC was not an agency for FOIA
purposes.71 This surprising move represented a reversal of a Sept-
64. See Armstrong IV, 821 F. Supp. 761, 763 (D.D.C. 1993).
65. See id. at 766-68.
66. See id. at 768-71. For example, some of the backup tapes were in poor condi-
tion; the guardians of the tapes failed to recopy those in advanced states of deterioration,
thereby increasing the likelihood of destruction. See id. at 770.
67. Armstrong V, 1 F.3d 1274, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
68. See id. at 1296.
69. See id. at 1277. The opinion was issued on August 13, 1993. See id.
70. See Armstrong VII, 90 F.3d 553, 557 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (citing Memorandum from
Walter Dellinger, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, to Alan J.
Kreczko, Special Assistant to the President and Legal Advisor, National Security Council
(Sept. 20, 1993)) [hereinafter Dellinger Memorandum]. The proclamation also signified
that the NSC was not subject to the provisions of the FRA. See id. In the interest of
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ember 6, 1978 Memorandum by the OLC, which stated that the
NSC was an agency for FOIA purposes. 1 In its 1978 statement,
the OLC addressed the concerns of those who felt that FOIA
might unconstitutionally intrude upon the President or the NSC:
"[D]ue to the nature of the work of the NSC and its staff it is
clear that valid exemptions are available for the vast bulk of the
material which constitutes NSC records. 72 As to the question
whether complete immunity from FOIA could ever be achieved by
the NSC, the 1978 OLC thought it most clearly could not: "Nor
could it be shown on evidence now available that the act's impact
on NSC is so onerous that its ability to function in support of the
President will be impaired."'73 Despite this clear language in the
earlier statement, the Dellinger Memorandum did not seek to
offer any explanation why the situation of the NSC had changed.
President Clinton subsequently approved the OLC's revised
stance but indicated that the NSC should "voluntarily" make some
records available.74 On March 24, 1994, two significant events
occurred. First, the National Archives and Records Administra-
tion75 promulgated new regulations applicable to all Federal
agencies.7 6 Second, President Clinton, in a memorandum to Na-
tional Security Advisor Anthony Lake and NSC Executive Secre-
tary William Itoh, directed that the NSC "[e]stablish procedures
full disclosure, it is significant to note that Professor Dellinger sits on the faculty of
Duke University School of Law and on the Board of the Duke Law Journal.
71. The 1978 Memorandum was issued in conjunction with President Carter's signing
the Presidential Records Act into law. See Armstrong VII, 90 F.3d at 576 (Tatel, J.,
dissenting) (citing 2 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 197, 205 (1978)).
72. Id. at 579 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (quoting 2 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 197, 205
n.15).
73. 1&
74. Id. at 557 (quoting Memorandum from the President (Mar. 2, 1994)). These
records would include those that had been "transferred by one Administration to another
for transition and continuity purposes." Id. (quoting Memorandum from the President
(Mar. 2, 1994)).
75. This agency is responsible for promulgating procedures concerning the storage
and maintenance of governmental records. See 44 U.S.C. §§ 2108-2110 (1994) (prescribing
the duties of the Archivist of the United States, who heads the National Archives and
Records Administration).
76. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 59 Fed. Reg. 13,906, 13,906 (1994). In addi-
tion, certain components of the Executive Office (notably, the Office of Administration,
the Office of the United States Trade Representative, the Office of Management and
Budget, the Office of National Drug Control Policy, and the Council of Environmental
Quality) received further guidelines on July 15, 1994. See Armstrong VI, 877 F. Supp.
690, 695 n.3, 715-40 (D.D.C. 1995).
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for access by the public to appropriate NSC records of the current
Administration.",7 Based on Clinton's language, it appeared that
he was authorizing the NSC to comply with FOIA requests; how-
ever, the next day, Secretary Itoh issued a written memorandum
echoing the OLC's position that the NSC is not an "agency" and
that all of its records are therefore Presidential Records subject to
the PRA,78 and thus are outside the ambit of FOIA.7 9
The problem with this scenario, aptly illustrated by the back-
ground to this case, is twofold. First, documents created by the
NSC or by the President in association with the NSC, would,
under the administration's position, be labeled Presidential Re-
cords, and thus become destroyable or at least suppressible for up
to twelve years after the conclusion of a President's term.0 The
documents created and destroyed by Colonel North and his associ-
ates demonstrate the problem with this arrangement.8'
Furthermore, unscrupulous members of an administration
might shift functions from a recognized "agency" to the NSC-or
simply create certain documents under the auspices of the NSC.
Even though these documents might technically become available
later under the PRA, the NSC will not be required to establish
exacting policies for the storage and retrieval of documents that
the FRA and FOIA require.' For example, the electronic mail
cache files at issue in Armstrong VII would not be protected un-
der the PRA; they could be deleted permanently at any time, by
any NSC employee. Consequently, the government could potential-
ly use the NSC as a repository for documents to which it does not
wish the public to have access.
In addition, the announcement that the NSC was no longer an
agency obviated nearly twenty years of the NSC's referring to
itself as such and producing documents pursuant to FOIA as a
result of that moniker;' the D.C. Circuit's endorsement of this
77. Id. at 696 (quoting Memorandum from the President to Anthony Lake, National
Security Advisor, and William H. Itoh, National Security Council Executive Secretary
(March 24, 1994)).
78. See id For a brief explanation of the PRA, see supra notes 25-29, 55-56 and
accompanying text.
79. See Armstrong VII, 90 F.3d at 559.
80. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
82. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1994).
83. See Armstrong VI, 877 F. Supp. at 696 n.5. The fact that the NSC was, at least
until March 25, 1994, subject to FOIA is not even contested by the government. See id
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approach8 4 sets a troublesome precedent. Apparently, the NSC
decided that it would be less burdensome simply to take itself out
of FOIA altogether than to store its documents under the rigorous
requirements of FOIA and the FRA; as the late Judge Charles
Richey of the District Court opined, this move was "contrary to
law [and] without any reasoned explanation." 5
Recognizing these potential pitfalls, the District Court found
chilling the prospect that an arm of the government could unilat-
erally remove a department of government from the sphere of
public access.86 Accordingly, on February 14, 1995, the D.C. Dis-
trict Court granted Armstrong's motion for summary judgment,
holding that the NSC was indeed an agency.7
Needless to say, the government was not satisfied with the
overruling of its position that the NSC was not an agency, and it
appealed to the D.C. Circuit again. In the course of its appeal, the
government urged that the President's dealings with the NSC
require privacy and confidentiality and should be shielded from
FOIA."8 The Government asserted that, despite the exemption
for national security information, the mere possibility of "prema-
ture disclosure" of information would chill the President's commu-
nications with the NSC and adversely affect his development of
at 706. On October 7, 1994, the government filed a Motion to Withdraw and Amend
Prior Responses to Requests for Admissions with the District Court for the District of
Columbia, wherein the NSC had characterized itself as an "agency" subject to FOIA and
to the FRA. See id. at 697 n.8.
84. See Armstrong VII, 90 F.3d at 565-66 (holding that the NSC is no longer an
agency subject to FOIA despite its former status as such).
85. Armstrong VI, 877 F. Supp. at 697; cf. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC,
444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (holding that a decision to reconstrue the nature of a
governmental unit must be reasonable in order not to be held arbitrary and capricious).
86. The district court's decision in Armstrong VI reflects concerns similar to those
voiced by Judge Patricia Wald in her dissent in Meyer v. Bush:
[The majority's approach] clearly maps out the formula for getting around dis-
closure laws in the [EOP]: First, put a small unit of decisionmakers atop a larg-
er establishment of persons who carry out those decisions, and insist that be-
cause only the implementers have a staff, only they form the "agency." Second,
when necessary, maintain that the "significant authority" resides only with the
implementers and that the "whole" of the decisionmaking unit is less than the
sum of its parts. That is, if you sever the "brains" of an organization from the
"body," the people who call the shots are never in the public's sights.
981 F.2d 1288, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (Wald, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
87. See Armstrong VI, 877 F. Supp. at 697.
88. See Armstrong VII, 90 F.3d at 557.
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foreign policy.89 The stage was thus set for 1996's most significant
FOIA decision.
II. FOIA COVERAGE OF ExECuTIvE BRANCH AGENCIES
A. The NSC and Agency Status
Prior to the D.C. Circuit's decision in Armstrong VII, it was
unquestioned that the NSC exercised substantial independent au-
thority, and was in fact an agency which made its records accessi-
ble under FOIA.9' And, although the D.C. Circuit has never ex-
pressly established that the NSC is an agency under FOIA,9 it
has spoken often on the issue of agency status for other entities
within the EOP.9" In previous decisions, the D.C. Circuit, using a
rationale adopted in Soucie v. David,93 has held that certain units
of the EOP are agencies subject to the requirements of FOIA,
usually employing the rationale that they operated less as an arm
of the President and more like independent agencies.94 Those ele-
ments of the EOP which do not constitute FOIA agencies tend to
89. Id.
90. See Armstrong VI, 877 F. Supp. at 706.
91. The D.C. Circuit and other courts which have addressed FOIA in conjunction
with the NSC have always characterized the NSC as an agency, or, more precisely, sim-
ply assumed that it is one. See; e.g., Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the
Press, 445 U.S. 136, 156 (1980) (discussing the NSC as an agency under FOIA); National
Sec. Archive v. Archivist of the United States, 909 F.2d 541, 542 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (ob-
serving, without further comment, that FOIA requests were filed with the NSC); Rush v.
Department of State, 748 F. Supp. 1548, 1549 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (noting that the NSC re-
viewed documents for FOIA release); Willens v. National Sec. Council, 726 F. Supp. 325,
325, 327 (D.D.C. 1989) (describing FOIA transaction between plaintiff and the NSC). In
an unpublished opinion, Mangold v. CIA, No. 88-1826, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18421, at
*5 (D.D.C. May 3, 1989), the court mentions that the NSC announced to a FOIA re-
quester that the request was delayed because of a backlog of FOIA requests which it
was processing.
92. See, eg., Pacific Legal Found. v. Council on Envtl. Quality, 636 F.2d 1259,
1262-63 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (designating the Council on Environmental Quality as a FOIA
agency because of its authority as an independent entity to "issue guidelines to federal
agencies," "coordinate federal programs," and oversee discrete activities of other agen-
cies); Sierra Club v. Andrus, 581 F.2d 895, 902 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (determining that the
Office of Management and Budget is a FOIA agency due to its statutory duty to provide
budgetary information to Congress); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1075 (D.C. Cir.
1971) (holding the Office of Science and Technology to be a FOIA agency because of its
independent authority to evaluate federal scientific programs, involve itself in research,
and award scholarships).
93. 448 F.2d at 1073-75.
94. See Armstrong VII, 90 F.3d at 558-59; see also supra note 92 (collecting cases).
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be those which have no regulatory functions suggesting indepen-
dent authority.'
Remarkably, the Armstrong VII court held that the NSC was
no longer an agency.96 In the course of its opinion, the court em-
phasized that units of the EOP whose sole functions are to advise
and assist the president are not "agencies." ' In other words,
units which do not exercise "substantial independent authority"
are not agencies. 98
In adopting this position, the court applied the test that it
first articulated in Meyer v. Bush.99 That opinion attempted to
elucidate the status of entities within the EOP by suggesting that
an entity which "help[s] the President supervise others in the
95. See, eg., Sweetland v. Walters, 60 F.3d 852, 854-55 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding
that the Staff of the Executive Residence is not covered under FOIA because those
individuals manage the White House subject to the President's direction and approval,
and without significant independent authority); Rushforth v. Council of Economic Advi-
sors, 762 F.2d 1038, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (finding that the Council of Economic Advis-
ors is'not subject to FOIA because it lacks the regulatory powers that an agency exercis-
ing independent authority would normally possess).
96. See Armstrong VII, 90 F.3d at 559.
97. See id. at 563.
98. I& at 555-62; see also supra note 16. As a preliminary matter, FOIA defines an
"agency" as "any executive department, military department, Government corporation,
Government controlled corporation, or other establishment in the executive branch of the
Government (including the Executive Office of the President), or any independent regula-
tory agency." 5 U.S.C. § 552(0 (1994). This definition is substantially more specific than
that included elsewhere in the Administrative Procedure Act: "each authority of the Gov-
ernment of the United States, whether or not it is within or subject to review by another
agency." 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (1994). As discussion of Armstrong VII will demonstrate, the
federal courts have greatly restricted this broad definition of "agency" in recent years.
See generally infra text accompanying notes 123-89. In particular, the D.C. Circuit has
limited access to documents produced by certain EOP units under a strict test first an-
nunciated in Meyer v. Bush, 981 F.2d 1288, 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1993). See infra text accom-
panying notes 101-02. This distinction-between the plain language of FOIA and the
court's interpretation of that language-originated with Congress' effort, in its 1974
amendments to FOIA, to codify that portion of the D.C. Circuit's Soucie opinion, see 448
F.2d at 1073, 1074, which included the Executive Office of the President among the list
of "agencies" generally subject to FOIA. See S. CoNF. No. 93-1200, at 15 (1974), reprint-
ed in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6285, 6293 (stating that "[w]ith respect to the meaning of the
term 'Executive Office of the President' the conferees intend the result reached in Soucle
v. David"). In 1980, the Supreme Court held, based on the 1974 legislative history, that
FOIA did not apply to "the President's immediate personal staff or units in the Execu-
tive Office whose sole function is to advise and assist the President." Kissinger v. Report-
ers Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 156 (1980) (quoting H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 93-1380, at 15 (1974)). The Kissinger Court found that only the National Secu-
rity Advisor himself was excluded from FOIA coverage; it did not extend its holding to
the entire NSC. See FUNK ET AL., supra note 30, at 595.
99. 981 F.2d 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
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executive branch" only exercises substantial independent authority
in certain situations." ° Apart from mere advice and assistance to
the President, under the Meyer test an "agency" exists when 1)
the unit is not in close proximity to the President, 2) the "nature
of [the unit's] delegation from the President," is such that it has
the potential to exercise independent authority 01 and 3) the unit
100. ld. at 1295.
101. "Independent authority" may take one of two forms within the agency framework
of the federal government. It is firmly established that Congress, with the approval of the
President, may delegate power to administrative "agencies." Administrative agencies in-
clude both executive agencies (Cabinet Departments, e.g., Commerce, and their subunits,
e.g., the International Trade Administration) and independent regulatory agencies (outside
any Department, e.g., the Federal Trade Commission). See FUNK ET AL., supra note 30,
at 11-12. Indeed, only two such delegations have ever been declared unconstitutional. See
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495, 541-42 (1935) (declaring the Na-
tional Industrial Recovery Act's (NIRA) "fair competition" provisions invalid because
they supplied the President with "virtually unfettered" control over trade and industry);
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 432-33 (1935) (holding unconstitutional an
NIRA provision which delegated power to the President without providing an intelligible
principle for its exercise).
The delegation of power to independent agencies led to debates about their consti-
tutionality in the early part of the century, largely because the Constitution vests the
entire power of government in three coordinate branches-Legislative, Executive, and
Judicial-and not in amalgamated structures which exercise each of these responsibilities
within a single organization. See FUNK Er AL., supra note 30, at 469. During the New
Deal, the myriad agencies created by the Roosevelt administration to combat the Great
Depression presented the federal judiciary with the novel question whether these indepen-
dent agencies could be countenanced under the Constitution. To a great degree, this
question turned on the ability of the agencies to perform the functions of government
outside the reach of the Executive and Legislative branches. In the seminal case of
Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), a unanimous Supreme Court
greatly abetted the rise of independent agencies as a permanent part of government by
holding that, while the President could remove from office individuals who were "merely
one of the units in the executive department," id. at 627 (for example, the Secretary of
Commerce), the President had no power over those individuals who maintain "no place
in the executive department and who exercise[] no part of the executive power." Id. at
628 (for example, in Humphrey's, the Chair of the FTC); compare Myers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52, 134 (1926) (holding that the President may exercise "unrestricted
power" in directing the actions to be taken by his executive subordinates) with Tim
FEDERALIST No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton) (rejecting the notion of a "plural executive"
in favor of a centralized system which vests power exclusively in a unitary authority) and
EDWARD S. CORWiN, THE PRESiDENr. OFFIcE AND POWERS, 1787-1984 3-30 (Randall
W. Bland et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984) (same). By implication, the newly created independent
agencies were not exclusively the "executive departments," but shared elements of execu-
tive, legislative, and judicial authority. See Gerhard Casper, An Essay in Separation of
Powers: Some Early Versions and Practices, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 238-42
(1989); Nathan D. Grundstein, Presidential Power, Administration and Administrative Law,
18 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 285, 298-302 (1950). The distinguishing feature of independent
agencies, then, is that they are created by Congress but possess functions typical of each
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has "a self-contained structure."' 2 If an organization within the
Executive Branch meets the three parts of the Meyer test, it is an
agency for FOIA purposes.
In its application of the Meyer test to the facts of Armstrong,
however, the court turned in a different direction, allowing one
prong of the test to subsume the other two. Although the record
in the case demonstrated that "responsibilities delegated to the
NSC are in fact carried out without the personal involvement of
the President,"'"' in applying the first prong, the court found
that the NSC is proximate to the President mostly because he is
himself a member of it."° Of course, the President is an ex offi-
cio member of other EOP groups,"5 and, as Judge David Tatel
observed in his dissent, independent functions are often exercised
by the less-proximate NSC staff and by numerous NSC interagen-
cy groups in which the President does not directly participate."°6
branch, with the exception that the President may not exercise removal power over agen-
cy officials. See Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 356 (1958) (holding that the adju-
dicatory nature of the War Claims Commission implicitly limited the President's power to
remove); Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. at 631-32 (restricting the ability of the President
to remove non-Executive Branch officials). But see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 143
(1976) (holding that the Federal Election Commission, an independent agency, was un-
constitutional as constituted because it violated the Appointments Clause of Article II by
circumventing the appointment procedure for "Officers of the United States").
It almost goes without saying, then, that presidential control and supervision over
the decisions of independent agency officers is limited. See Cass R. Sunstein, Con-
stitutionalism after the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 444 (1987). But see id. at 454
(noting that the Reagan administration attempted to control the independent agencies by
concentrating regulatory authority in the Office of Management and Budget). While the
final word on the extent of the President's control over independent agencies is still
disputed, see id. at 452-62, it seems clear that, if the President has the constitutional
power to delegate authority to an independent agency, he certainly may delegate to an
agency entirely within the Executive Branch (such as the NSC).
102. Meyer, 981 F.2d at 1293.
103. Armstrong VII, 90 F.3d at 569 (Tatel, ., dissenting).
104. See id. at 560. The majority found the fact that the President heads the NSC
"overwhelming" in its determination that the "the NSC is not an agency subject to
FOIA." Id. at 565. By making this seemingly insignificant logical leap (from the
President's being on the Council to its serving solely to advise and assist the President),
the court created a heavy burden for Armstrong to surmount regarding the nature of the
authority delegated to the NSC. Meyer, however, stipulated that Congress intended the
phrase "solely to advise and assist" the President to symbolize entities which were similar
to the President's immediate personal staff. Meyer, 981 F.2d at 1293. The phrase should
have nothing to do with whether the President is a member of the agency.
105. For example, the President is a member of the Council on Environmental Qual-
ity and the Office of Science and Technology, both of which are FOIA agencies. See
Meyer, 981 F.2d at 1291-92.
106. See Armstrong VII, 90 F.3d at 568 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
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Skipping to the third prong, the members of the court did not
dispute that the NSC has a self-contained structure."° Plainly,
the NSC is structured such that it may exercise substantial inde-
pendent authority.08
The court instead concentrated on the second prong of the
test, the nature of the authority delegated to the NSC. In its most
basic form, the NSC is an entity created by Congress with several
significant responsibilities that Congress authorized it to under-
take."° The President has also delegated power to the NSC."0
Notwithstanding the delegations of power made to the NSC, the
court found that the nature of that power was not sufficiently
independent; rather, the NSC has remained always an instrument
intended to advise and assist the President."' Thus, because the
107. See id. at 559-60, 568 (Tatel, J., dissenting). The district court also characterized
the NSC as having a "firm structure," including staff and a separate budget. See
Armstrong VI, 877 F. Supp. 690, 700-01 (D.D.C. 1995).
108. See Armstrong VII, 90 F.3d at 560. The NSC has a hierarchical organization
chart, an elaborate self-contained bureaucracy, and a "professional corps" of over 150
people, all emblematic of an agency as defined by the Meyer test. Id.
109. See National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 402(a)-(b) (1994). The NSC is
authorized to: (a) advise the President upon national security matters; (b) coordinate the
policies and functions of other departments and agencies regarding national security mat-
ters; (c) assess and appraise the objectives and commitments of, and the risks facing, the
United States; (d) consider policies on national security matters; and (e) make recommen-
dations to the President. See id. Armstrong argued persuasively that the Act conveys
certain non-advisory authority on the NSC. For example, the Director of Central Intelli-
gence acts "[u]nder the direction of the National Security Council," 50 U.S.C. §
403-3(a)(1), and "as the President or the National Security Council may direct," id. §
403-3(c)(6). Nevertheless, the majority in Armstrong VII determined that the NSC does
not "direct" the CIA absent an order from the President. See Armstrong VII, 90 F.3d at
561.
110. Cf. Armstrong VII, 90 F.3d at 570 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (contrasting those units
within the EOP which merely assist the President with those to which the President has
delegated responsibility for action). But cf. id. at 561 (holding that the NSC does not
have enough presidential delegation of power to act independently). The district court
determined that successive presidents, through Executive Orders and National Security
Decision Directives, have expanded the NSC's involvement beyond its statutory mandate:
the NSC performs rulemaking and adjudicatory functions, and plays an independent role
in intelligence, telecommunications, protection of national security information, arms con-
trol verification, nonproliferation, and public diplomacy. See Armstrong VI, 877 F. Supp.
at 701-03.
111. See Armstrong VII, 90 F.3d at 561. The court submits as proof of this fact a
statement from the report of the Tower Commission: the NSC "'has from its inception
been a highly personal instrument of the President' and 'remain[s] a strictly advisory
body."' Id. (quoting JOHN TOWER ET AL., REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL RE-
vmwv BOARD at 1I-1, 11-2 (1987)). The Tower Commission was created by President
Reagan to investigate the involvement of NSC staff members in the Iran-Contra affair.
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court found that the NSC's power was not sufficiently indepen-
dent, the court held that the NSC is not an agency for the purpos-
es of FOIA.112
B. Critique of the Court's Holding
The Armstrong VII holding can be criticized on many
grounds. In order to evaluate the court's conclusion about the
NSC's authority, it is significant first to consider that the NSC
bears an unusual relationship to the President and to the Execu-
tive structure. On the one hand, the NSC, as a unit of the EOP,
is part of the immediate cadre of advisors and officials whose
locus is strictly within the Executive Branch of the federal govern-
ment. As such, it is dissimilar from independent agencies, which
have a more attenuated relationship to the Executive Branch."'
Additionally, most departments within the Executive Branch are
"agencies" for the purpose of FOIA."4 These agencies have
See Exec. Order No. 12,575, 3 C.F.R. § 241 (1987).
112. See Armstrong VII, 90 F.3d at 565.
113. See supra note 101. Independent agencies are functionally neither within the
Executive Branch nor truly outside it. They are "independent of political forces general-
ly" and reside in a "headless fourth branch" which is subject to the President's influence,
but not his or Congress's direct control. Michael Herz, United States v. United States:
When Can the Government Sue Itself?., 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 893, 948-49 (1991).
The characterization of independent agencies as "headless" was originally conceived in
derogation by the Brownlow Commission in the 1930's, when the agencies' continued
existence was still in doubt. See THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON ADMIN. MANAGEMENT,
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE WITH STUDIES OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (1937), reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON SEPARATION OF POWERS,
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, U.S. SENATE, SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE INDEPEN-
DENT AGENCIES: CASES AND SELECrED READINGS, S. DOC. NO. 91-49, at 34 (1969).
While independent agencies were roundly criticized during their inception in the Franklin
Roosevelt administration, "the rubric of the headless fourth branch has persisted, acting
as a useful rhetorical pejorative despite prevailing judicial and scholarly opinion that it is
a 'constitutional impossibility."' Morton Rosenberg, Congress's Prerogative Over Agencies
and Agency Decisionmakers: The Rise and Demise of the Reagan Administration's Theory
of the Unitary Executive, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 627, 635 (1989) (citation omitted).
Ultimately, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of independent agencies, and
has continued to do so despite repeated challenges. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S.
654, 659-60 (1988) (holding that a statutory scheme designed to protect administrative
officials from Executive control is constitutional); Humphrey's Executor v. United States,
295 U.S. 602, 625-26 (1935) (holding that the NLRB was "independent of executive
authority" and "free to exercise its judgment without the leave or hindrance of any other
official or any department of the government"). But cf. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714,
732-34 (1986) (holding that an official who may be removed from office by Congress
may not possess executive powers).
114. See supra note 92. FOIA refers to "establishment[s] in the executive branch" as
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been created both by acts of Congress (as the NSC was) and by
Executive fiat."5
The NSC has as its principal function "to advise the President
with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military
policies relating to the national security" and to perform "such
other functions as the President may direct."'16 However, the
President may (and often does) delegate additional responsibilities
to Executive Office agencies such as the NSC."7 When the Pres-
ident makes such a delegation, the characterization of an agency's
role within the EOP changes dramatically: an entity performing a
delegated function is no longer principally "advising" the Presi-
dent. Rather, it is undertaking a duty which, in the absence of the
agency, another Executive Branch unit or even the President him-
self, would be required to perform. Assisting the President in this
fashion is quite attenuated from the type of aid contemplated by
the "advise and assist" exception to FOIA; if such were not the
case, then every Executive Branch agency, from the EOP units to
the Environmental Protection Agency, would no longer be subject
to FOIA since each one in some way "assists" the President with
his duties. In his impassioned dissent, Judge David Tatel warned
that, by construing the "advise and assist" language in broad
terms, the court was laying the groundwork for excepting all EOP
agencies. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(f) (1994). For additional discussion of the term "agency,"
see supra notes 101, 113, and accompanying text.
115. See Meyer v. Bush, 981 F.2d 1288, 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (Wald, J., dissenting)
(observing that the authority granted to an agency may originate with Congress or with
the President).
116. National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 402(a)-(b) (1994). The Council con-
sists of the President and several cabinet-level officials, including the National Security
Adviser (NSA)-technically called the Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs. See Armstrong VII, 90 F.3d at 556. The NSC's staff consists of approximately 150
people, see id., and is headed by an Executive Secretary, appointed by the President
without Senate approval, who reports to the NSA. See 50 U.S.C. § 402(c) (1994).
117. See infra notes 159-73 and accompanying text. In this sense, the President's dele-
gation authority is no different from that of Congress vis-A-vis the President himself.
Congress often makes spending powers discretionary on the part of the Executive Branch;
by so doing, the Legislative Branch is delegating its power to- spend under Article I of
the Constitution to the President, who has no such independent authority under Article
II. See Raines v. Byrd, 117 S. Ct. 2312 (1997) (discussing the line-item veto while clearly
contemplating that such a delegation may be constitutional). This practice has persisted
since the founding of the Republic, with judicial approbation, yet one would never sug-
gest that the President is "assisting" Congress in any substantial fashion. The only "assis-
tance" which the President provides is cursory and flows from Congress's decision to
voluntarily cede some of its authority to another branch of government.
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units from FOIA merely because the President's involvement
could somehow be traced to the various units."' He wrote that
"the 'advise and assist' exception [has] swallow[ed] the FOIA
rule,""' 9 for any delegation the President makes can, if read
broadly enough, be interpreted to be for the purpose of assisting
him.120
By way of example, consider the case of the Staff of the
Executive Residence (Staff) versus the NSC. In Sweetland v.
Walters,' the court correctly held that the Staff did not consti-
tute an agency because its members only offered advice and assis-
tance to the President." This distinction with the NSC should
be immediately apparent: the Staff assists the President by main-
taining the physical plant of the White House, duties clearly not
delegated to it by the President but rather performed as the sole
function of the Staff's existence. By contrast, the NSC not only
advises and assists the President under its statutory mandate; it
also performs duties expressly delegated to it by the President and
removed from his immediate oversight. The same can and has
been said of, inter alia, the Office of Management and Budget, the
EPA, and the various subentities of the Cabinet departments.
Although the Armstrong VII court held that these delegated
duties did not amount to independent functions," history plainly
demonstrates that the NSC does more than simply "advise and
assist ' 4 the President, notwithstanding the language of its statu-
tory mandate; it forms and implements its own agendas. For ex-
ample, during and after the Iran-Contra affair, President Reagan
successfully propounded his claim that he was never aware of the
actions taken by his subordinates in the NSC." Taken at face
value, this suggests that the NSC does more than serve in an advi-
sory capacity.
The campaign donations scandal that recently occupied
Congress is also instructive on this point. In the days surrounding
118. See Arnstrong VII, 90 F.3d at 569.
119. Id.
120. See id.
121. 60 F.3d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
122. Id. at 854-55.
123. See Armstrong VII, 90 F.3d at 561, 565; supra notes 110-12 and accompanying
text.
124. For an early examination of this concept, see Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067,
1075 (D.D.C. 1971).
125. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
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the 1996 election and in the months following, potential indiscre-
tions in Democratic Party fundraising came to light.1' In particu-
lar, the press centered on President Clinton's numerous invitations
to wealthy Democratic Party supporters to visit the White House
as well as his meetings with a controversial Chinese-American
businessman, Johnny Chung." The Washington Post discovered
that the NSC had written a memorandum to President Clinton
describing Chung as a "hustler" and suggesting that the President
not entertain him." Clinton denied ever seeing the memoran-
dum, stating "I never saw it and no one ever told me it had been
written, and I don't know who did see it."'29 The Washington
Post summed up the problem with this rhetorical question, which
might have been written for this Note with a slight alteration:
"Why did the National Security Council memo describing Chung
as a hustler and warning about too much contact with him never
reach the Oval Office [if the NSC's sole function is to advise and
assist the President, and it never acts absent his explicit knowledge
or consent]?"'30 Notwithstanding this incident or the Iran-Contra
machinations in which the NSC played a central role, and in
which President Reagan urged that the NSC undertook actions
without his explicit approval or request, the administration con-
126. See, eg., Charles R. Babcock, Indonesian Businessman Riady Met with Clinton to
Discuss Business, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 1996, at A4 (describing a September 1995 meet-
ing between President Clinton and Indonesian businessman and major Democratic donor,
James Riady, at which the latter raised his concerns about personal business projects);
John F. Harris, Indonesian Provided Hospitality for DNC Chairman's Daughter, WASH.
POST, Nov. 3, 1996, at A31 (reporting favor provided to DNC Chairman Donald Fowler
by the Lippo Group, an Indonesian financial conglomerate headed by the Riady family).
127. See, eg., Andrew Miga, Clinton: Might Have Made White House Fund Calls, Bos-
TON HERALD, Mar. 8, 1997, at 1 (recounting allegations of illegal and improper
fundraising at the White House and one of President Clinton's visits with Johnny Chung,
a controversial businessman and Democratic donor, who is alleged to have bought access
to the President and other key figures in the Clinton administration for foreign business-
men).
128. See Sharon LaFraniere & Susan Schmidt, NSC Gave Warnings about Asian Do-
nors, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 1997, at Al. The NSC had alerted the President that Chung
was "a hustler" who would attempt "to trade on his connections to President Clinton and
Hillary Rodham Clinton, even presenting himself as a free-lance diplomat for the presi-
dent." Id. Notwithstanding this warning, White House aides admitted Chung to the Exec-
utive Mansion numerous times. See id.
129. Transcript of President Clinton's News Conference, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 1997, at
AIO.
130. Dan Balz, Lawyerly Stance Delivered with Campaign Style, WASH. POST, Mar. 8,
1997, at Al.
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tends, and the D.C. Circuit holds, that the NSC is not an
"agency" because it never exercises independent authority or un-
dertakes independent action.
Another strong criticism of the Armstrong VII decision is that
precedent supports the conclusion that the NSC is an agency.'
The NSC itself has, for most of the life of FOIA, considered itself
to be an agency. 3 1 The NSC complied with FOIA as early as
1975, when it issued FOIA regulations. 3  In addition, other units
of the government considered the NSC to be an agency for FOIA
purposes.Y Further, the legislative history of the 1974 FOIA
Amendments suggests that Congress also intended for the NSC to
be treated as an agency for FOIA purposes." Congress explicit-
ly stated that the amended FOIA definition of "agency" would en-
compass "such functional entities as ... the National Security
Council.' 3 6 While the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
previously refused to rely on this report since a subsequent Con-
ference Report endorsed the Soucie test without enumerating
specific FOIA agencies,'37 the Supreme Court has cited the 1974
131. See Armstrong VII, 90 F.3d 553, 577-78 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (Tatel, J., dissenting)
(discussing prior cases which stand for the proposition that an agency should not be
treated as a non-agency simply because it may perform advisory functions).
132. See iL at 576.
133. See Freedom of Information Act Requests for Classified Documents-Processing,
Fees, Reports, Applicable Material, Declassification Criteria, Partial Release, 40 Fed. Reg.
7316, 7316 (1975) (codified at 32 C.F.R. § 2101 (1996)). Furthermore, in 1975, 1976, 1977,
and 1978, the NSC complied with FOIA's requirement that "each covered agency annu-
ally submit a copy of its FOIA regulations and a report of its administration of FOIA to
the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President of the Senate for
referral to appropriate congressional committees." Armstrong VII, 90 F.3d at 576 (Tatel,
J., dissenting); see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(e) (1994) (setting out the FOIA requirement to
report to the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate).
134. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, APPLICABILI-
TY OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION Acr TO THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESI-
DENT 20 (1978), reprinted in Presidential Records Act of 1978: Hearings Before a Subco-
mm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations on H.R. 10998 and Related Bills,
95th Cong. 759, 778 (1978) [hereinafter PRA Hearings]. The Congressional Research Ser-
vice concluded that eight units of the EOP, including the NSC, were agencies for FOIA
purposes. See id. The Report observed that "[t]he NSC has FOIA regulations and has
been the subject of court cases under the Act. The NSC has an active FOIA compo-
nent." Id. at 8, reprinted in PRA Hearings, supra, at 766. Furthermore, the Office of
Legal Counsel advised President Carter that the NSC is an agency under FOIA. See 2
Op. Off. Legal Counsel 197, 205 (1978).
135. See H.R. REP. No. 93-876, at 8 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6267,
6274.
136. Id.
137. See Rushforth v. Council of Econ. Advisors, 762 F.2d 1038, 1040 (D.C. Cir.
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House report and referred to it as "indicating that the National
Security Council is an executive agency to which ...FOIA ap-
plies."'38
A further criticism of the Armstrong decision lies in its reli-
ance on the theory that the NSC-as-agency has negative constitu-
tional ramifications. The administration argued that if the NSC
were allowed to remain an agency, such power would overlap with
the nature of the President's power as enumerated under Article
II of the Constitution.'39 Although the government argues that
subjecting the NSC to FOIA "would violate constitutional separa-
tion of powers principles by intruding improperly into the
President's exercise of his constitutional duties,"'" the Supreme
Court has suggested otherwise.' 4' While the government in this
case anticipated unconstitutional intrusions if NSC documents were
made available to the public, 42 there is no evidence that such
intrusions ever occurred during the time the NSC complied with
FOIA under Presidents Ford, Carter, Reagan, and Bush, or in the
first year of President Clinton's administration. 43 Furthermore,
1985); see also supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text (describing the Soucie test).
138. Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 156
(1980). The Court held that documents related to the activities of the Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs when "act[ing] in his capacity as a Presidential
adviser, only" were not subject to FOIA. Id. (emphasis added). This statement implies
that the NSA may act in other, non-advisory capacities.
139. Principally, the concern advanced by the government is that having to adhere to
record-keeping procedures mandated by FOIA would interfere with the President's duty
to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
140. Armstrong VII, 90 F.3d 553, 578 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (Tatel, J., dissenting).
141. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 445 (1977) (holding that
"abundant statutory precedent [exists] for the regulation and mandatory disclosure of
documents in the possession of the Executive Branch"). The Supreme Court, in applying
FOIA to former President Nixon's presidential papers and tape recordings, indicated that
FOIA, as applied to material "generated in the Executive Branch," is not "considered
invalid as an invasion of [the Executive Branch's] autonomy." Id
142. See Armstrong VII, 90 F.3d at 555.
143. See Armstrong VII, 90 F.3d at 578 (Tatel, J., dissenting). Since no problems of a
constitutional nature have yet arisen, it is appropriate to apply the maxim adopted by the
Supreme Court not to "'anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the
necessity of deciding it."' Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring) (quoting Liverpool, New York & Philadelphia S.S. Co. v. Emi-
gration Comm'rs, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885)). If a particular constitutional separation of
powers issue confronts the President in his ability to carry out his duties, then the D.C.
Circuit may reconsider its decision to hold certain aspects of the NSC subject to FOIA.
See Armstrong VII, 90 F.3d at 579 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (quoting Nixon, 433 U.S. at 443,
for the proposition that "the proper inquiry focuses on the extent to which [an act of
Congress] prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned
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since FOIA already exempts materials classified "in the interest of
national defense or foreign policy,"' 44 if FOIA were applied to
the NSC, the documents recoverable under the statute would
clearly not pose a substantial risk "of improper intrusion into the
President's exercise of his constitutional responsibilities.' 141 In-
deed, the President could have FOIA-proof interactions with his
National Security Advisor by explicitly requesting that individual's
advice and/or assistance.'4 Perhaps most important is that the
government offers no persuasive rationale that distinguishes the
NSC's sensitive role from that of other agencies, such as the De-
partment of State or the Central Intelligence Agency, which are
subject to FOIA and which engage in "sensitive foreign af-
fairs."'147 Ironically, none of these problems materialized in the
twenty years that the NSC, as an "agency," complied with FOIA.
Another criticism of the opinion is the availability of the
"dual-hat" rationale to make certain NSC documents available to
the public. The Supreme Court, in Kissinger v. Reporters Commit-
tee for Freedom of the Press,"4 endorsed the rationale that an
individual serving a department of government may wear more
than one "hat."'4 9 When an individual serves in two capacities,
as an advisor to the President and as a member of an agency, that
functions. Only where the potential for disruption is present must we then determine
whether that impact is justified by an overriding need to promote objectives within the
constitutional authority of Congress.").
144. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)(A) (1994).
145. Armstrong VII, 90 F.3d at 579 (Tatel, J., dissenting). In 1978, the Office of Legal
Counsel of the Department of Justice concluded that, if the NSC were subject to FOIA,
this status would not place an unconstitutional burden on the President or the NSC:
[D]ue to the nature of the work of the NSC and its staff it is clear that valid
exemptions are available for the vast bulk of the material which constitutes
NSC records .... We have also considered whether NSC could raise a valid
constitutional claim to general immunity from the FOIA, and we believe this
possibility is very weak. Certain records of the NSC could, if necessary, be
protected by a claim of executive privilege, but such a claim could not success-
fully be invoked to preclude Congress from opening to public view some NSC
administrative records and other nonsensitive records to which the claim could
not reasonably attach. Nor could it be shown on evidence now available that
the Act's impact on NSC is so onerous that its ability to function in support of
the President will be impaired.
Id. (Tatel, J. dissenting) (quoting 2 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 197, 205 n.15 (1978)).
146. See Armstrong VII, 90 F.3d at 579.
147. Id. at 580 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
148. 445 U.S. 136 (1985).
149. See id. at 156 (holding that notes made by the National Security Advisor qua
Presidential advisor were not agency records despite his dual role as an official of the
NSC, where his notes were records of the agency).
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person's records are not subject to FOIA in the prior instance, but
are in the latter. 5 For example, the D.C. Circuit held that cabi-
net members could be subject to FOIA as heads of agencies, but
not as members of the Task Force on Regulatory Relief."' The
Meyer dissent also observed that the records of the Vice President
"'in his capacity as advisor to the President"' were distinct from
those "'that were received or generated by the Task Force which
he chairs.""' 15 2 But the court in Armstrong VII pointedly avoids this
"dual-hat" discussion, an issue that, if considered, would have
altered the outcome of the case. 53 Indeed, as Judge Tatel rightly
observed in his dissent, "nothing in FOIA ... supports treating
agencies or their parts as non-agencies whenever they perform
advisory functions;"'" rather, only those advisory documents are
exempted from FOIA. When a member of an agency performs a
non-advisory function, her documents have traditionally been in-
cluded as FOIA documents. 55
The Armstrong VII decision can also be attacked on the
ground that the court found that the principal purpose of the NSC
is to advise and assist the President and that the agency is there-
fore not "independent" of the President.'56 Judge Tatel observed
150. See, e.g., id. (holding that documents produced as a result of Kissinger's interac-
tion with the President were not subject to FOIA); cf Ryan v. Department of Justice,
617 F.2d 781, 786-89 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (finding that the Attorney General would not be
an "agency" under FOIA when she acts solely in an advisory capacity to the President).
151. See Meyer v. Bush, 981 F.2d 1288, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
152. Id. at 1311 n.21 (Wald, J., dissenting).
153. See Armstrong VII, 90 F.3d at 558.
154. Id. at 577 (Tatel, J., dissenting). Judge Tatel's dissent merely carries forward the
D.C. Circuit's prior resolution of this point in Ryan. See Ryan, 617 F.2d at 787-89. Be-
cause all EOP units are subject to FOIA except those whose sole functions are to advise
and assist the President, see Armstrong V, 1 F.3d 1274, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 1993), and since
some entities subject to FOIA also advise and assist the President, it follows that certain
individuals might sometimes be exempt from FOIA, while the agencies themselves will
not be exempt under the "not-an-agency" rationale. See Armstrong VII, 90 F.3d at
577-78 (Tatel, J., dissenting). In a situation in which the individual moves from her agen-
cy position to her advise-and-assist position, those latter records are not agency records.
See id. at 578. At all times, however, the agency itself remains subject to FOIA. See id.
(delineating the distinction by observing that "otherwise qualifying records in the control
of NSC officials while acting in NSC capacities should be considered agency records for
purposes of FOIA ... even if such officials [in some circumstances] . . . act to advise
or assist the President").
155. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
156. Ironically, the 1978 Memorandum establishing that the NSC was subject to FOIA
admits that the NSC functions "in support of the President." 2 Op. Off. Legal Counsel
197, 205 n.15; see supra note 73 and accompanying text. Even so, the Carter administra-
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that, if this reasoning were stretched, there would be no way for
any "EOP unit ... [to] be 'independent' of the President in the
way that independent agencies outside the executive branch
can." '5 7 In other words, according to the majority at least, since
the NSC cannot act over the objection of the President, it there-
fore is not independent; this tautology is quickly exposed since the
NSC, like other semi-independent entities, does in fact act without
the President's specific approval in many situations. Saying that
the President's failure to object to an action is tantamount to
active approval is laughable hyperbole. The President has not, nor,
would one assume, does he want to be involved in the quotidian
aspects of the NSC's functioning.158 In fact, the NSC carries out
several functions which do not directly involve giving advice or
assistance to the President.'59 Any one of these functions should
suffice to indicate that the NSC is an agency for purposes of
FOIA, because, despite the fact that in some instances NSC activi-
ties will be exempt from FOIA, the NSC's many independent
functions still define it as an agency. Two such functions will serve
as instructive examples.
First, in the area of public diplomacy, the NSC's interagency
groups have substantial independent authority.' 60 The NSC Spe-
cial Planning Group is responsible for overseeing "public diploma-
cy activities" and must ensure that "a wide-ranging program of
effective initiatives is developed and implemented to support na-
tional security policy, objectives and decisions.' 16' For example,
the Special Planning Group supervises a variety of subgroups,
including the International Political Committee, whose objective is
tion did not view those duties as limiting the FOIA coverage of NSC documents. See id.
157. Armstrong VII, 90 F.3d at 572 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
158. The government argued in the alternative that, because the NSC shares some of
its authority with other agencies, and it has never had to implement other elements of its
authority, it is not subject to FOIA. See Armstrong VII, 90 F.3d at 563. According to
Meyer, however, the "sole function" test concerns the question whether the EOP unit is
or is not too similar to the President's personal staff; if it is not too similar (meaning
that it takes some action that is independent of the President), then it is an agency. See
Meyer, 981 F.2d at 1293. Furthermore, just because the NSC cooperates and shares duties
with another agency does not exempt it from FOIA; it simply means that both agencies
are "potentially subject to FOIA." Armstrong VII, 90 F.3d at 572-73 (Tatel, J., dissent-
ing).
159. See Armstrong VII, 90 F.3d at 568-69 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
160. See id. at 574 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
161. Id. (Tatel, J., dissenting) (quoting National Security Decision Directive 77, at 1
(Jan. 14, 1983) [hereinafter NSDD 77]).
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to provide "aid, training and organizational support for foreign
governments and private groups to encourage the growth of demo-
cratic political institutions and practices."'62 This type of training
clearly goes beyond "assisting the President."' '
The International Broadcasting Committee, another committee
concerned with public diplomacy and overseen by the Special
Planning Group, undertakes technical planning relating to interna-
tional broadcasts,'" activities that "are almost certainly indepen-
dent of any direct involvement by the President."'" If, as the
majority believed, such activity is not independent of the President
because it conforms "to overall goals fixed by the President, ' ' "6
every activity of every executive branch actor would be exempt
from FOIA, since every executive action in some way relates to a
goal of the President. 67 But it has been established by the D.C.
Circuit itself that other elements of the EOP are FOIA agen-
cies."6 Here, as elsewhere in this discussion, "[t]he key question
is not who sets the goals toward which an entity works, but
whether an entity itself takes action in furtherance of executive
branch goals.' ' 169 Because the Special Planning Group is charged
with "the overall planning, direction, coordination and monitoring
of implementation of public diplomacy activities,"'7 0 it almost
surely exercises "substantial independent authority."''
162. Id. at 574-75 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (quoting NSDD 77, supra note 158, at 2).
163. Id. at 575. (Tatel, J., dissenting). If this action could be considered "assisting the
President," then "nearly all executive branch activity" would be subsumed under that
heading. Id. (Tatel, J., dissenting).
164. See id. (Tatel, J., dissenting) (citing NSDD 77, supra note 158, at 3). These plan-
ning activities include the implementation of anti-jamming devices to ensure that broad-
casts reach their intended targets. See id. (Tatel, J., dissenting).
165. Id. (Tatel, J., dissenting).
166. Id. (Tatel, J., dissenting) (quoting the majority opinion).
167. See id. (Tatel, J., dissenting).
168. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
169. Armstrong VII, 90 F.3d at 575 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
170. Id. (Tatel, J., dissenting) (quoting NSDD 77, supra note 158, at 1).
171. Id. (Tatel, J., dissenting). Judge Tatel also believed that the Special Planning
Group's function of "periodically review[ing] the activities of the four permanent coordi-
nating committees to insure that plans are being implemented and that resource commit-
ments are commensurate with established priorities," id. (Tatel, J., dissenting) (quoting
NSDD 77, supra note 158, at 1), was similar to the Office of Science and Technology's
(OST) independent authority to evaluate federal scientific programs, initiate and support
research, and award scholarships that warranted agency treatment of the OST in an earli-
er D.C. Circuit opinion. See id. (Tatel, J., dissenting) (citing Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d
1067, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).
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Second, in the realm of emergency preparedness, the NSC
exercises independent authority delegated to it by the President.
The NSC sets the guidelines for contingent emergencies, and these
guidelines must be followed by other agencies."7 Interestingly, if
it were true that the President and the NSC are inseparable inso-
far as policy and decisionmaking go, why would the President, in
his executive orders, need to specify that other agencies should
adhere to NSC proclamations? 73 Other agencies would simply
follow the NSC's direction as equivalent to the President's direc-
tion, and this stipulation would seem redundant, unless the NSC is
a separate and easily cognizable entity.74
172. See Exec. Order No. 12,656 § 104(a), 3 C.F.R. 586 (1989), reprinted in 42 U.S.C.
§ 5195 note (1994). However, in Armstrong VII, the government argued that, notwith-
standing this delegation, the NSC functions only as the "principal forum" for policy con-
sideration. See Armstrong VII, 90 F.3d at 563 (quoting Exec. Order No. 12,656 § 104(a)).
173. See Exec. Order No. 12,919 § 104(c), 3 C.F.R. 902 (1995), reprinted in 42 U.S.C.
§ 5195 (1994) (requiring that the heads of all entities of the federal government with re-
sponsibility for national defense preparedness must ensure adherence to NSC "policy and
guidelines" in that area).
174. The NSC also exercises some independent authority in the areas of information
security, nuclear nonproliferation, and telecommunications. See Armstrong VII, 90 F.3d at
570-74 (Tatel, J., dissenting). An example of such authority in the information security
area is the NSC's discretion to determine "whether waivers should be granted to permit
federal agencies to use non-standard security forms." Id. at 570 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
The pertinent regulation states that, "as part of a 'government-wide information security
program' to 'enhance the protection of national security information and/or [to] reduce
the costs associated with its protection,' executive branch departments and independent
agencies must use a standard non-disclosure form." Id. (Tatel, J., dissenting) (alteration in
original) (quoting 32 C.F.R. § 2003.1 (1995)). Employees of these units must sign the
form "before being granted access to classified information," id. (Tatel, J., dissenting)
(quoting 32 C.F.R. § 2003.20(b)-(c)); despite the fact that use of the standard form is
"mandatory," id. (Tatel, J., dissenting) (quoting 32 C.F.R. § 2003.2), "an agency may
request a waiver from . . . using the standard form," id. (Tatel, J., dissenting) (citing 32
C.F.R. § 2003.20(k)), and "'[o]nly the National Security Council may grant an agency's
request for a waiver from the use of the [standard form]."' Id. (Tatel, J., dissenting)
(alterations in original) (quoting 32 C.F.R. § 2003.20(k)). As part of this process, the
NSC receives a report from the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office
and the Department of Justice before it alone determines whether the waiver will be
granted. See id. (Tatel, J., dissenting).
An example of the NSC's independent authority in the area of nuclear nonprolifer-
ation is its authority to "review and make recommendations regarding export license
applications." Id. at 573. (Tatel, J., dissenting). The regulations implementing section
309(c) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2139a(c) (1994), are the
starting place for such authority. Id. (Tatel, J., dissenting). That Act gave the Secretary
of Commerce the duty "to initiate procedures for review of export licenses covering
'items . . .that could be of significance for nuclear explosive purposes if used for activi-
ties other than those authorized at the time of export."' Id. (Tatel, J., dissenting) (quot-
ing 15 C.F.R. § 778A.2(a) (1996)). If the Secretary, in consultation with the Department
19971] FOJA AND THE NSC 1507
Another criticism involves the fact that the line which the
majority attempts to draw between agencies and non-agencies is
an artificial one. It is with arbitrary fiat that the court considers
the Office of Science and Technology's or the Council on Envi-
ronmental Quality's regulatory duties to be more independent than
those of the NSC. The President could just as easily inject his
opinion, and, indeed, his orders, into the day-to-day functioning of
those entities as he could to that of the NSC. The difference for
the court apparently lies in the type of information which it would
like to exempt from even basic FOIA consideration.
That information is that which might reflect poorly on the
United States' intelligence or military operations in this country
and abroad. Traditionally, FOIA requests to the FBI and the CIA,
two entities which are indisputably agencies under FOIA or any
other statute, have faced the greatest opposition to disclosure and,
consequently, requests backlog for years in these agencies.' 7
While FOIA was eventually amended to address the FBI/CIA
administrative problem and facilitate more timely replies, adjudica-
tion often centers on the question whether those agencies are
moving fast enough or in a non-arbitrary manner. 76 This ques-
tion was apparently put to rest by the D.C. Circuit's opinion two
of Energy, believes that an export license application should be denied or reviewed by
another agency, the application must be referred to the Subgroup on Nuclear Export
Coordination (SNEC) of the NSC Ad Hoc Group on Nonproliferation. Id (Tatel, J., dis-
senting). The SNEC "'shall [then] promptly consider any such application and provide its
advice and recommendations to the Department of Commerce."' Id. (Tatel, J., dissenting)
(quoting Procedures Established Pursuant to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978,
15 C.F.R. § 778, supp. 1 (1996) [hereinafter Non-Proliferation Procedures]). "If the SNEC
reaches agreement on the application, the Commerce Department must consider the
SNEC's recommendation ... and must give the license applicant an opportunity to re-
spond to a negative SNEC recommendation." Id. (Tatel, J., dissenting) (citing 50 U.S.C.
App. § 2409(f)(1)(2) (1994)). If the SNEC does not find accord as to its recommenda-
tion, then it "may refer the matter to the NSC Ad Hoc Group on Non-Proliferation . . .
or afterward to the President." Id. (Tatel, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citing Non-
Proliferation Procedures, 15 C.F.R. § 778, supp. 1 (1996).
175. See, ag., Electronic Privacy Info. Ctr. v. FBI, 865 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1994)
(finding that the FBI's backlog of over eleven thousand pending requests did not excuse
its failure to process a FOIA request in a timely manner).
176. Although an agency generally has ten working days to determine if it will com-
ply with a FOIA request, it can get a ten working-day extension in "unusual circum-
stances," such as requests involving voluminous records or multiple agencies or offices.
See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)-(B) (1994). Additional time may be allowed only in "excep-
tional circumstances" and only if "the agency is exercising due diligence in responding to
the request." Id. § 552(a)(6)(C).
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decades ago in Open America v. Watergate Special Prosecution
Force,7' which gave the government some leeway in producing
documents requested under FOIA.1'7
However, despite the rubric established in Open America to
identify which delayed responses to FOIA requests are justified,
courts still frequently must resolve questions surrounding the FBI's
and CIA's backlog delay.179 On one level, the D.C. Circuit's de-
cision in Armstrong VII is unabashedly self-interested. If the court
can restrain curious information-seekers from delving into yet an-
other sensitive area, it will conserve judicial resources and avoid
having to address repeatedly the backlog issue. In this case,
Armstrong sought information about the NSC from a time at
which it was most vulnerable: the Iran-Contra years of the
mid-1980s. 1' It is entirely possible that a motivation of the court
is to keep the floodgates of information about this era dammed.
Notwithstanding the possibility of such a rationale, the NSC over-
whelmingly satisfies the court's own standard for agencies, and
should be treated as such for purposes of FOIA.
Additionally, it is troublesome that the D.C. Circuit's decision
forces individuals like Armstrong "to show that the NSC exercises
significant independent authority in order to qualify it as an agen-
cy. ''" 81 Traditionally, the burden of proof lies with the plaintiff to
show that a document held by an agency is a record pursuant to
FOIA,' but the administration's recharacterization of the NSC
changes the playing field. Since the government has sole access to
information which proves whether an entity is or is not an agency,
177. 547 F.2d 605 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
178. See id. at 615-16. In Open America, the court, in interpreting FOIA section
552(a)(6)(C), found "exceptional circumstances" present when the FBI was able to show
the court that 1) it was backlogged "with a volume of requests for information vastly in
excess of that anticipated by Congress;" 2) "existing resources [were] inadequate to deal
with the volume of requests within the time limits of [5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)];" and 3)
the agency was "exercising due diligence" in processing the requests. Id. at 616. As a re-
sult, the D.C. Circuit validated the F.B.I's first-in, first-out program for handling requests
and construing the statutory time provision in such cases such as "directory" rather than
mandatory. See id.
179. See Electronic Privacy, 865 F. Supp. at 2 (denying the FBI's motion to stay a
FOIA request for release of surveys of state and local law enforcement authorities in
connection with FBI director Louis J. Freeh's efforts to secure a new wiretapping law).
180. See supra notes 33-47 and accompanying text.
181. Armstrong VII, 90 F.3d 553, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
182. See iL at 562 (stating that the burden of proof is on Armstrong to show that
the NSC is an agency under the three-factor test of Meyer).
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the burden should be on the government to demonstrate that the
entity is not an agency, particularly when that entity has repeat-
edly characterized itself as such for convenience's sake." Other-
wise, a plaintiff such as Armstrong can only argue that an entity is
an agency by inference or by reference to generally-known facts
about a unit such as the NSC. Given the inequity of resources in
this definitional contest, it is unlikely that a private citizen could
ever successfully prove that a unit of government is an agency
when that entity steadfastly maintains that it is not.
Finally, contrary to Armstrong VII, the stated purpose of
FOIA suggests that documents possessed by the government
should, if at all possible, be made available to the publicY 4
FOIA was enacted ostensibly to bring the workings of government
into the antiseptic light of public view." The motivation behind
the Act was to provide free and clear access for the American
public to government-held information."6 Despite the fact that
the Supreme Court's frequent invocation of the "plain meaning"
doctrine'" disfavors making assumptions about Congress' inten-
tions, plain meaning jurisprudence in the realm of FOIA is clearly
demarcated by the presence of statutory exemptions to disclo-
sure.' 8 Congress intended only those documents which it
183. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
184. Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1994) (stating that "any reasonably segregable portion of
a record" exempt under FOIA shall be disclosed pursuant to a FOIA request).
185. See H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, at 11 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2418,
2429.
186. See id.; see also United States Dep't of Defense v. Federal Labor Relations
Auth., 510 U.S. 487, 494 (1994) (recognizing that the main purpose of FOIA is to ensure
full agency disclosure); United States Dep't of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 177-78 (1991)
(observing that the central purpose of FOIA is to enforce "the citizens' right to be in-
formed about 'what their government is up to').
187. Plain meaning jurisprudence has developed gradually over the past decade, and in
a variety of contexts. See, e.g., Rutledge v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1241 (1996) (relying
on the "plain meaning" of statutory language to determine the meaning of a statute);
Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 687--88 (1988) (holding interpretation of Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 404(b) which departed from the "plain language" of the text to be
inconsistent with the act's purpose); Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 178 (1987)
(holding that "[it would be extraordinary to require legislative history to confirm the
plain meaning of [a statute]"); Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 75 (1984) (holding
that "only the most extraordinary showing of contrary intentions from [the legislative
history] would justify a limitation on the 'plain meaning' of the statutory language").
But see Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 160-63 (1995) (placing substantial weight
on Advisory Committee Note and common law tradition in interpreting the Federal
Rules of Evidence).
188. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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deemed best excluded to be kept from public scrutiny; by clear
rule, all other documents were to be made available for public
perusal."s A simplistic view (but not one without a realistic ba-
sis) of FOIA is that, if a document falls clearly into an exempt
category, it should not be released; if it does not fall into such a
category, it must be disclosed."9 The information sought by the
appellants in Armstrong VII did not clearly fall into an exempt
category.
III. COUNTERPOINTS TO ARMSTRONG VII IN OTHER FOIA
DEVELOPMENTS IN 1996
While the Armstrong VII decision represented a defeat in the
ongoing movement for public access to information, both FOIA's
stated purpose and other recent developments in FOIA law sug-
gest that the Armstrong VII decision is misguided. Armstrong VII,
while certainly significant, can also be viewed as anomalous.
Two other cases decided during 1996 suggest that the holding
in Armstrong VII restricting access to government documents is a
spurious one. In Avondale Industries, Inc. v. National Labor Rela-
tions Board,9' despite the fact that information that the NLRB
was required to release could potentially be used for suspect pur-
poses, the court construed FOIA's exemptions narrowly (which is
the traditional interpretation) to allow as much information as
possible into the hands of the public."9 Another court, in
DeLorme Publishing Co. v. National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Admin.,' 93 held that, while the government could delay release
of certain nautical charting information, it must make such infor-
mation available at the conclusion of a period of time designated
by statute.194 In sharp contrast to Armstrong VII, these two signifi-
cant decisions opened government-held information to public in-
spection.
189. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1994) (listing the categories of information that the gov-
ernment must disclose).
190. But cf. discussion of current practice infra note 202.
191. 90 F.3d 955 (5th Cir. 1996).
192. See id. at 961-62.
193. 917 F. Supp. 867 (D. Me. 1996).
194. See Ud at 870-74.
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A. The Avondale Case
In Avondale, the court balanced the individual's right to pri-
vacy against "the basic policy of opening an agency's action to the
light of public scrutiny,"'95 and released government documents
instead of retaining them.'96 The dispute involved a union elec-
tion held at a factory (Avondale) in which the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) participated in a supervisory role."9
Following the election, which the union won, Avondale presented
to the Acting Regional Director of the NLRB its FOIA claim for
access to the voting lists prepared by the NLRB for the elec-
tion. 9 ' The NLRB denied the FOIA request, citing Exemptions
6, 7(A), and 7(C). 99
The court began its discussion by contrasting the competing
interest of the public to inspect documents of official record"
with individual citizens' interest in protecting their privacy.2°
This balancing of interests must give equal consideration to the
individual's right to privacy and to the preservation of the basic
purpose of FOIA (opening agency action to public scrutiny).'
195. Avondale, 90 F.3d at 959. The Fifth Circuit fell back upon its earlier decision in
Halloran v. Veterans Administration, 874 F2d 315 (5th Cir. 1989), where it held that
[B]ecause our focus must be upon whether disclosure serves the general public's
interest in governmental affairs, the specific motives of the party making the
FOIA request are irrelevant. If the general public has a legitimate, albeit ab-
stract, interest in the requested information such that disclosure is warranted,
disclosure must be made despite the fact that the party actually requesting and
receiving the information may use it for less-than-lofty purposes.
Conversely, if disclosure of the requested information does not serve the
purpose of informing the citizenry about the activities of their government, dis-
closure will not be warranted even though the public may nonetheless prefer,
albeit for other reasons, that the information be released.
ld. at 323.
196. See Avondale, 90 F.3d at 962.
197. See id. at 956-57.
198. See id. at 957.
199. See id. Exemption 6 allows an agency to retain, without disclosure, personnel or
medical files. All parts of Exemption 7 relate to information surrounding law enforce-
ment. See 5 U.S.C. § 522(b)(7) (1994). For a complete list of exemptions, see supra note
15 and accompanying text.
200. See Avondale, 90 F.3d at 959. The court's opinion refers to "[flederal regulations
[which] state that[] 'the formal documents constituting the record in a case or proceeding
are matters of official record and ... are available to the public for inspection."' Id.
(quoting 29 C.F.R. § 102.117(b)(1) (1996)).
201. See id. at 960 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6)).
202. See United States Dep't of Defense v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S.
487, 487 (1994); Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372 (1976).
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The NLRB asserted that there was no public interest in the
marked voting lists because access to the lists would not contrib-
ute to the public's understanding of the operations of the govern-
ment, which is the central purpose of FOIA;1 rather, the infor-
mation would at best simply have been a means of "monitoring"
the government, and, at worst, a vehicle by which Avondale might
draw unfair inferences about the voting employees and the
Board's activities.' Avondale, by contrast, suggested that mere
attendance at a government-sponsored election is "a quintes-
sentially public act" quite separate from the content of one's
vote.' Avondale further argued that the disclosure of the lists
was indeed a matter of public interest because it would illuminate
the NLRB's performance of its duty to conduct representative
elections.'
203. See Avondale, 90 F.3d at 960. Recent examinations of FOIA decisions have
found, however, that the Supreme Court has been willing to depart from its "plain mean-
ing" jurisprudence in order to construe the statutory exemptions to FOIA in as broad a
fashion as possible. See, e.g., Beall, supra note 30, at 1257-58 (observing that the Su-
preme Court has interpreted FOIA to require only the release of information in "the
public interest," rather than all information that otherwise might be disclosable given a
strict reading of FOIA's exemptions). This precedent, identified as the "central purpose"
doctrine, has at its core the philosophy that FOIA demands release only of those docu-
ments which directly concern the government's operations. See Fred H. Cate et al., The
Right to Privacy and the Public's Right to Know: The "Central Purpose" of the Freedom
of Information Act, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 41, 67 (1994). This doctrine has served to narrow
the field of acceptable FOIA requests that the government must process. According to
the "central purpose" doctrine, if information contained in government documents stops
short of merely "[opening] to the sharp eye of public scrutiny" the activities of the fed-
eral government, the documents need not be released. Department of Justice v. Reporters
Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 774 (1989).
While the "central purpose" doctrine was initiated to protect individuals' privacy,
the Armstrong VII case suggests that courts are now willing to go farther to retain infor-
mation within the government's cloister. See Armstrong VII, 90 F.3d 553, 556 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (holding that NSC documents need not be released because the NSC is not an
agency under FOIA). In other words, despite the fact that the NSC documents at issue
in Armstrong VII neither implicated the privacy interests of American citizens nor fell
under a FOIA exemption, the court held that the information contained in such docu-
ments need not be released by the government because the NSC does not meet the
dubious new "agency" standard articulated by the court. See id. This development may
be conceived, not so much as an expansion of the central purpose doctrine, but as an
accretion of authority to the advocates of limited disclosure, whose primary weapon to
this point has been the central purpose doctrine.
204. See Avondale, 90 F.3d at 962.
205. See id. at 960.
206. See id.
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The court found that the information was important under the
central purpose of FOIA because it would allow Avondale (a
member of the public) "to determine whether the NLRB is prop-
erly conducting its elections."'' The court believed that, in order
to prove the voter fraud that Avondale alleged, the company must
know who voted.' Surprisingly, the court stated that "disclosure
of the marked voting lists will likely enable Avondale to prove
such allegations."' Consequently, the court held Exemption 6
inapplicable because it found significant "the public's interest in
monitoring NLRB sponsored elections" and negligible the privacy
invasion of individual citizens.21
207. Id. at 961. Ironically, under this interpretation, the voting lists are exactly the
sort of information which FOIA's opponents would want withheld. See, eg., Alfonse M.
D'Amato & Antonia M. Greenman, The Freedom of Information Act and the CIA: How
S. 1235 Will Enhance Our Nation's Security, 9 J. OF LEGIS. 179, 182-83 (1982) (suggest-
ing that a problem with FOIA is that it allows the disclosure of information to the
wrong sorts of people). The more traditional, pre-"central purpose doctrine" view is per-
haps best summarized by Judge Wald, who has observed that "FOIA, like all basic free-
doms, sometimes hurts the worthy and sometimes helps the unworthy." Patricia M. Wald,
The Freedom of Information Act A Short Case Study in the Perils and Paybacks of Leg-
islating Democratic Values, 33 EMORY LJ. 649, 683 (1984).
208. See Avondale, 90 F.3d at 962 (citing John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493
U.S. 146, 152 (1989) (holding that "[tihe basic purpose of FOIA is to ensure an in-
formed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society, needed to check against
corruption and to hold the governors accountable to the governed")).
209. Id. at 962 (emphasis added). As an aside, it is difficult to imagine how merely
reviewing the lists will "prove" anything. If individuals did pose as others and vote multi-
ple times, a tactic that Avondale alleges kept anti-union voters from having their votes
tallied, the lists will in no way reveal it. The lists contain only voters' names and ad-
dresses, not their photos or other identifying information. See id. at 957 n.1. Conse-
quently, the dispute will likely devolve into a shouting match over whose word is more
reliable: the affiants who claim that they were prohibited from voting as a result of this
conspiracy versus the keepers of the NLRB's lists, whose documentation indicates that
they did in fact vote.
Furthermore, the acquisition of the voter lists would reveal little about whether
there actually was voter fraud, for either side could have altered the voter list. Pursuant
to a pre-election agreement between Avondale and the NLRB, both an Avondale observ-
er and a union observer were present to monitor the voting at each zone. See id. at 957
n.2. Thus, the union officials could have altered voting lists to cover up fraud, or
Avondale officials could have altered voting lists to fabricate evidence of non-existent
voter fraud.
A cynic might argue that Avondale may have invented a conspiracy because of its
hostility to the union and that it is in fact seeking to harass pro-union workers and the
NLRB by prolonging its charges, charges it will never be able to "prove." Indeed, ap-
proximately sixty unfair labor practices charges had been filed by the union against
Avondale within months after the election and about the time that Avondale filed its
FOIA request. See id. at 957 nA.
210. Id. at 962. The court granted summary judgment against Avondale on its Exemp-
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In Armstrong VII, of course, the government avoided the
issue whether the public has an interest in monitoring the NSC's
actions by taking that entity out of FOIA consideration at a
threshold level. By changing the NSC's status from that of an
agency to that of an advisory body to the President, the D.C.
Circuit opened the door for cases like Avondale to be decided
differently. Under Armstrong VII, materials which were of signifi-
cant public interest and which were not otherwise exempt under
FOIA, were retained in secret by the government. Had a similar
anti-access rationale been applied in Avondale, the NLRB might
have retained the information, perhaps under the theory that
information requested for suspect purposes should not be made
available for inspection. In short, if a court can narrow the reach
of FOIA by reconstruing an agency in midstream, the judiciary
might envision innumerable scenarios to restrict the free flow of
information.
B. The DeLorme Case
In another significant 1996 decision, DeLorme Publishing Co.
v. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA),
the court illustrated the principle that while certain information
might be restricted from public view for a period of time, when
applied properly FOIA assures that all information eventually will
be made public.212 In DeLorme, the court exempted information
from disclosure under FOIA Exemption 3.213 The case revolved
around NOAA's214 cooperative venture with a private partner to
produce an electronic nautical charting system.2' NOAA collab-
orated with BSB Electronic Charts between August and November
tion 7 claims because that exemption applies only to law enforcement issues. See id.
211. 917 F. Supp. 867 (D. Me. 1996).
212. See iL at 870.
213. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1994). For a complete catalog of exemptions, see supra
note 15.
214. NOAA is a subdivision of the Department of Commerce.
215. See DeLormne, 917 F.Supp. at 870. Such an agreement, known as a cooperative
research and development agreement (CRADA), is authorized and indeed encouraged by
the Federal Technology Transfer Act (FITA). See 1L; see also 15 U.S.C. § 3710a (1994)
(allowing federal agencies to permit directors of agency laboratories to enter into cooper-
ative research and development agreements with industrial organizations, nonprofit organi-
zations, individuals and other government agencies). DeLorme was among the firms which
expressed an interest in the project, but the government chose BSB Electronic Charts to
be its partner. See DeLorme, 917 F. Supp. at 870.
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1994 in the production of electronically-rendered nautical charts;
the DeLorme Publishing Company filed two FOIA requests in
November 1994 seeking disclosure of those compilations.216
NOAA refused to provide the information.217
The court construed a statute, the Federal Technology Trans-
fer Act (RITA),21 8 under Exemption 3 of FOIA, which permits
an agency to withhold records that are "specifically exempted from
disclosure by [a] statute" other than FOIA.2 19 The court's opin-
ion was based on the 1989 amendments to the FTTA.' These
amendments provide two varieties of protection from disclosure of
"commercial... information that is privileged or confiden-
tial."" The first, a so-called "trade secrets" exception, does
not apply here. The second type of protection gives the agency
discretion to withhold information for up to five years if it would
have been protected coming from the private partner.' Deter-
mination of how this discretion will be implemented (if the infor-
mation is "confidential") depends on two factors: first, whether
disclosure will "impair the Government's ability to obtain neces-
sary information in the future[;]" or, second, whether disclosure
will "cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the
person from whom the information was obtained."' A second,
216. See DeLorme, 917 F. Supp. at 870.
217. See id.
218. See Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-502, 100 Stat.
1785, 1785-97 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
219. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1994). However, to satisfy Exemption 3, the statute must,
"(A) require[] that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to
leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establish[] particular criteria for withholding or
refer[] to particular types of matters to be withheld." Id.
220. See 15 U.S.C. § 3710a(c)(7) (1994). Congress initially intended the FITA "to
improve the transfer of commercially useful technologies from the Federal laboratories
and into the private sector," thereby strengthening the United States both militarily and
economically. S. REP. No. 99-283, at 1 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3442,
3442-43.
221. 15 U.S.C. § 3710a(c)(7)(A) (1994).
222. The "trade secrets" exception prohibits a federal agency from disclosing such
information if it "is obtained in the conduct of research or as a result of activities under
. . . [the FTrA] from a non-Federal party participating in a cooperative research and
development agreement [CRADA]." Id.
223. See id. § 3710a(c)(7)(B). Congress authorized this protection because "the threat
of disclosure under [FOIA] of commercial information, developed under the CRADA or
otherwise, has been the biggest reason to date for companies declining to enter
CRADAs." H.R. CoNF. RPt. No. 101-331, at 761 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N.
977, 1150.
224. DeLorme Publ'g Co. v. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin., 917 F. Supp.
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potentially more restrictive test has been adopted recently by the
D.C. Circuit.' This test holds that commercial information pro-
vided to the government is confidential "if it is of a kind that
would customarily not be released to the public" by the sub-
mitter. 6 Here, the court found that the result would be the
same, since mapping companies do not customarily release their
computer databases to the public.'
Nonetheless, the results of the compilation will be made avail-
able to the public, albeit somewhat later than DeLorme would
have wished. Significantly, the information will be protected and
stored in pristine form for the years that the FYTA allows it to be
suppressed, as those are the requirements of FOIA. It bears
repeating that the NSC's documents, under the new regime estab-
lished by the Clinton administration and endorsed by the D.C.
Circuit, may be corrupted or only partially protected by the
PRA,' 9 since FOIA no longer applies to those documents.
C. New Legislation
On October 2, 1996, the Clinton administration endorsed
bipartisan legislation updating FOIA to keep pace with technolo-
gy.30 This legislation codifies the decision in Armstrong III that
government records kept electronically are subject to disclosure
under the Federal Records Act, and by implication, FOIA. 1'
The new act requires agencies to make a concerted effort to pro-
vide records in a requested format whenever possible and directs
agencies to increase on-line access to government records. 232
867, 873-74 (D. Me. 1996) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
225. See Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 975 F.2d 871,
879 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
226. Id.
227. See DeLorme, 917 F. Supp. at 874 n.6.
228. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1994).
229. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
230. See Statement by William J. Clinton upon signing H.R. 3802, reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3477, 3478. The legislation, the Electronic Freedom of Information Act
Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-231, amended several sections of the Freedom of
Information Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (West Supp. 1997).
231. See Armstrong 111, 810 F. Supp. 335, 340-42 (D.D.C. 1993) (holding that certain
electronically stored NSC documents were records subject to disclosure under the Federal
Records Act); see also text accompanying notes 21-24.
232. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(3)(6) (West Supp. 1997) (requiring agencies to provide
records in any form requested if the record is readily producible in that form); Id. §
552(a)(2)(7) (requiring agencies to make records created on or after Nov. 1, 1996 avail-
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Ironically, this legislation will not apply to the NSC, whose docu-
ments will not be free for uncensored inspection after the
Armstrong VII decision.
CONCLUSION
Public access to information about the government took a
decided turn for the worse in 1996.1 The D.C. Circuit provided
the government with a loophole when it held that the National
Security Council is not an agency for FOIA purposes. In June
1997, the Supreme Court denied Armstrong's petition for certiora-
ri, effectively bringing to an end this eight-year struggle to pry
important historical documents away from the NSC.' Indeed,
the Court's summary affirmance of Armstrong VII means that, by
now, many Iran-Contra documents could have already been dest-
royed.
The Armstrong VII decision almost legitimizes the secretive
activities of Colonel North and Fawn Hall, since the decision
means that the documents they destroyed would not have been
subject to public inspection after all. Armstrong VII permits the
NSC to hide documents forever that might have shed light on the
Iran-Contra affair. After Armstrong VII, much information con-
cerning the workings of government, especially in the areas of
national security and defense policy, may never come into the
public view.
able by electronic means).
233. On October 11, 1996, the D.C. Circuit again denied Armstrong's request for doc-
uments on other grounds. See Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 97 F.3d
575, 577 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that the District Court did not err by failing to review
certain document requests in camera).
234. See Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 117 S. Ct. 1842 (1997).
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